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ON THE UNCOUNTABILITY OF R
DAG NORMANN AND SAM SANDERS
Abstract. Cantor’s first set theory paper (1874) establishes the uncountabil-
ity of R based on the following: for any sequence of reals, there is another
real different from all reals in the sequence. The latter (in)famous result is
well-studied and has been implemented as an efficient computer program. By
contrast, the status of the uncountability of R is not as well-studied, and we
therefore study the logical and computational properties of NIN (resp. NBI)
the statement there is no injection (resp. bijection) from [0, 1] to N. While
intuitively weak, NIN (and similar for NBI) is classified as rather strong on the
‘normal’ scale, both in terms of which comprehension axioms prove NIN and
which discontinuous functionals compute (Kleene S1-S9) the real numbers from
NIN. Indeed, full second-order arithmetic is essential in each case. To obtain a
classification in which NIN and NBI are weak, we explore the ‘non-normal’ scale
based on (classically valid) continuity axioms and non-normal functionals, go-
ing back to Brouwer. In doing so, we derive NIN and NBI from basic theorems,
like Arzela`’s convergence theorem for the Riemann integral (1885) and central
theorems from Reverse Mathematics formulated with the standard definition
of ‘countable set’. In this way, the uncountability of R is a corollary to most
basic mainstream mathematics; NIN and NBI are even (among) the weakest
principles on the non-normal scale, which serendipitously reproves many of
our previous results. Finally, NIN and NBI allow us to showcase to a wide
audience the techniques (like Gandy selection) used in our ongoing project on
the logical and computational properties of the uncountable.
1. Introduction
The uncountability of R deals with arbitrary mappings with domain R, and is
therefore best studied in a language that has such objects as first-class citizens.
Obviousness, much more than beauty, is however in the eye of the beholder. Lest
we be misunderstood, we formulate a blanket caveat: all notions (computation,
continuity, function, open set, et cetera) used in this paper are to be interpreted
via their higher-order definitions, also listed below, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
1.1. Apples, oranges, and uncountable sets. In a nutshell, we study the logical
and computational properties of the uncountability of R, established in 1874 by
Cantor in his first set theory paper [13], in the guise of the following principles:
• NIN: there is no injection from [0, 1] to N,
• NBI: there is no bijection from [0, 1] to N,
The principle NIN will take centre stage, while NBI will be shown to have some
interesting properties as well. Now, a central and important aspect of mathematical
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2 ON THE UNCOUNTABILITY OF R
logic is the classification of principles and objects in hierarchies based on logical
or computational strength. A natural question would therefore seem to be where
NIN is located in the well-known hierarchies of logical and computational strength,
generally based on comprehension and discontinuous functionals.
We will provide an answer to this question in this paper and explain why this
answer (and question) is unsatisfactory. Intuitively speaking, NIN is a very weak
principle, yet we need rather strong comprehension axioms to prove it. Similarly,
we need rather strong (discontinuous) comprehension functionals to compute the
real numbers claimed to exist by NIN, in Kleene’s higher-order framework. The
reason for this paradox is that we are comparing apples and oranges, as follows.
A fundamental division1 here is between normal and non-normal objects and
principles, where the former give rise to discontinuous objects and the latter do
not. The uncountability of R falls into the non-normal category2. To be abso-
lutely clear, comparing the logical and computational properties of normal and
non-normal objects and principles is comparing apples and oranges.
Indeed, the ‘normal vs non-normal’ distinction yield two (fairly independent)
scales for classifying logical and computational strength: the standard one is the
‘normal’ scale based on comprehension and discontinuous objects, like the Go¨del
hierarchy, Reverse Mathematics, and Kleene’s quantifiers (see Section 2). However,
we have shown in [64–69] that the normal scale classifies intuitively weak non-
normal objects and principles as ‘rather strong’. We establish the same for NIN
in Theorem 3.1 below. These observations imply the need for a ‘non-normal’ scale
based on (classically valid) continuity axioms and related objects, going back to
Brouwer’s intuitionistic mathematics. The non-normal scale, and its connection to
second-order arithmetic is explored in [75], and is discussed in Section 1.3.
In Figure 1 below, we provide a classification of NIN and NBI relative to other
non-normal principles. We exhibit numerous basic theorems that imply these prin-
ciples, including Arzela`’s convergence theorem for the Riemann integral ([1], 1885)
and central theorems from Reverse Mathematics (see Section 2.1) formulated with
the standard definition of ‘countable set’. Some of these connections are made into
computational results. As it turns out, NIN is among the weakest principles (in
terms of logical and computational properties) on the non-normal scale. In this
way, our results on NIN ‘reprove’ many of the results in [64–69], a nice bonus. Put
another way, this paper encompasses and greatly extends the results in [64–69]
based on perhaps the most basic property of R known to all mathematicians.
While the aforementioned results are interesting to any audience of mathemati-
cians, we also attempt to explain the underlying techniques to non-specialists, in
particular Kleene’s higher-order computability theory based on S1-S9 and the as-
sociated Gandy selection. We sketch the historical background to this paper in
Section 1.2, while a more detailed overview of our results is in Section 1.3.
1This division is based on the following definition from [55, §5.4]: for n ≥ 2, a functional of
type n (and hence of order n + 1) is called normal if it computes Kleene’s ∃n following S1-S9,
and non-normal otherwise. By [49, §3], the existence of ∃2 is equivalent to the existence of a
discontinuous function on R. Similarly, we call a statement about type n objects (n ≥ 2) normal
if it implies the existence of ∃n over Kohlenbach’s base theory from Section 2.1, and non-normal
otherwise. We use ‘strongly non-normal’ if for n ≥ 3 additionally ∃n−1 is not computed or implied.
2In fact, if all functions on R are continuous in a given system, NIN and NBI trivially hold too.
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1.2. Background: Cantor and the uncountability of the reals. Georg Can-
tor is the pioneer of the field set theory, which has evolved into the current foun-
dations of mathematics ZFC, i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of
Choice; Cantor also gave us the Continuum Hypothesis, the first problem on Hilbert’s
famous list of 23 open problems ([36, 37]), which turned out to be independent of
ZFC, as shown by Go¨del and Cohen ([18, 19, 31]). The interested reader can find a
detailed account of Cantor’s life and work in [21].
Our interest goes out to Cantor’s first set theory paper [13], which was published
in 1874 and even has its own Wikipedia page ([96]). This short paper includes the
following observation by Cantor.
Furthermore, the theorem in §2 presents itself as the reason why
collections of real numbers forming a so-called continuum (such as,
all the real numbers which are ≥ 0 and ≤ 1), cannot correspond
one-to-one with the collection (ν) [of natural numbers];
This quote may be found in [13, p. 259] (German) and in [24, p. 841], [33, p. 820],
and [21, p. 50], translated to English. Cantor’s observation about the natural and
real numbers may be formulated as the uncountability of R, taking into account
that Cantor only introduced the notion of cardinality some years later in [14].
Dauben provides an explanation in [21, p. 68-69] of why Cantor only mentions
the uncountability of R in passing, as a seemingly unimportant fait divers, in the
development of a new proof of Liouville’s theorem (on the existence of transcen-
dental numbers). According to Dauben, Cantor wrote [13] in its existing form so as
to avoid rejection by Kronecker, one of the editors and well-known for his extreme
stance against infinitary mathematics. Weierstrass seems to have played a similar,
but more moderate role, according to Ferreiro´s ([26, p. 184]). In a nutshell, while
results like the uncountability of R took centre stage for Cantor at the time, he
deliberately downplayed them in [13], so as to appease Kronecker and Weierstrass.
Next, in the above quote, Cantor deduces the uncountability of R from another
theorem, and the latter essentially3 expresses the following.
Theorem 1.1. For any sequence of distinct real numbers (xn)n∈N and any interval
[a, b], there is y ∈ [a, b] such that y is different from xn for all n ∈ N.
As it happens, a lot has been written about Theorem 1.1, its constructive status
in particular. We refer to [33] for a detailed discussion and overview of this matter.
We mention that [33] includes an efficient computer program that computes the
number y from Theorem 1.1 in terms of the other data; a proof of Theorem 1.1
in a weak logical system (expressing ‘computable mathematics’) can be found in
[82, II.4.9], while a proof in Bishop’s Constructive Analysis is found in [8, p. 25].
In conclusion, we may safely claim that Theorem 1.1 has a constructive proof, for
the various interpretations the latter term has. Since Cantor uses Theorem 1.1 to
conclude the uncountability of R in [13], it is a natural question what the logical and
computational properties of the latter are, as formalised by NIN and NBI. While of
independent historical and conceptual interest, NIN and NBI shall be seen to take a
central place in our ongoing project on the the logical and computational properties
of the uncountable, as may be gleaned from Figure 1 in the next section.
3Cantor states in [13] that the sequence in Theorem 1.1 can be given according to ‘any law’.
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1.3. Logical and computational properties of the uncountability of R. We
sketch the results to be obtained in this paper in some detail.
1.3.1. Introduction: NIN and its variations. In this section, we provide detailed
(but standard) definitions of NIN and NBI as well as some conceptual discussion.
We shall then sketch the to-be-obtained logical and computational properties of
these principles relative to the ‘normal’ scale based on comprehension and discon-
tinuous functionals (Section 1.3.2), as well as relative to the ‘non-normal’ scale
(Section 1.3.3) as summarised in Figure 1.
First of all, to be absolutely clear, the uncountability of R is a statement about
arbitrary mappings with domain R. Hence, the principles NIN and its ilk are in-
herently third-order, i.e. the below should be interpreted in classical4 higher-
order arithmetic, namely Kohlenbach’s higher-order Reverse Mathematics ([49]).
Similarly, computational properties are to be interpreted in Kleene’s higher-order
computability theory provided by S1-S9 ([45,55]). These frameworks are discussed
in some detail in Section 2.
Secondly, in light of the logical and computational properties of Cantor’s The-
orem 1.1 from [13] and all the attention this has received, one naturally wonders
about the logical and computational properties of Cantor’s corollary from [13],
namely the uncountability of R. To this end, we shall study the following principles
and associated functionals as in the next section.
Principle 1.2 (NIN). For any Y : [0, 1] → N, there are x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that
x 6=R y and Y (x) =N Y (y).
Principle 1.3 (NBI). For any Y : [0, 1]→ N, either there are x, y ∈ [0, 1] such that
x 6=R y and Y (x) =N Y (y), or there is N ∈ N such that (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) 6= N).
Finally, we stress that by Theorem 3.2, NIN can be proved without the Axiom
of Choice, i.e. within ZF set theory. Hence, it is a natural question which (compre-
hension) axioms imply NIN, as discussed in Section 1.3.2.
1.3.2. The uncountability of R and comprehension. In this section, we discuss the
logical and computational properties of NIN relative to the ‘normal’ scale based on
comprehension and discontinuous functionals. As noted in Section 1, this is only
a stepping stone towards a more detailed picture, discussed in Section 1.3.3 and
summarised by Figure 1.
First of all, the logical hardness of a theorem is generally calibrated by what
fragments of the comprehension axiom are needed for a proof. Indeed, the very aim
of the Reverse Mathematics program is to find the minimal (set-existence) axioms
that prove a theorem of ordinary5 mathematics. We discuss Reverse Mathematics
(RM hereafter) in some detail in Section 2.1 and note that RM-results fit in the
medium range of the Go¨del hierarchy ([83]), where this medium range is populated
by fragments of second-order arithmetic Z2.
Now, Simpson studies Theorem 1.1 in [82, II.4.9], suggesting that it and NIN
qualify as ordinary mathematics. This reference also establishes that Theorem 1.1 is
4As it turns out, there are some results on the uncountability of R in (semi-)constructive
mathematics ([5, 71]). These do not seem to relate directly to our below results.
5Simpson describes ordinary mathematics in [82, I.1] as that body of mathematics that is prior
to or independent of the introduction of abstract set theoretic concepts.
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provable in a weak system involving only ‘computable’ comprehension. By contrast,
there are two ‘canonical’ conservative extensions of second-order arithmetic Z2,
called Zω2 and Z
Ω
2 , such that NIN cannot be proved in Z
ω
2 and NIN can be proved in
ZΩ2 (see Theorems 3.1 and 3.2). Moreover, Z
ω
2 is based on third-order functionals S
2
k
that can decide (second-order) Π1k -formulas, while Z
Ω
2 is based on Kleene’s fourth-
order axiom (∃3). We refer to Section 2 for further details and definitions.
Secondly, Turing’s famous ‘machine’ model introduced in [94], provides an in-
tuitive and convincing formalism that captures the notion of ‘computing with real
numbers’. This formalism does not apply to e.g. arbitrary R → R-functions and
Kleene later introduced his S1-S9 schemes which capture ‘computing with higher-
order objects’ ([45,55]). With this framework in mind, studying the computational
properties of NIN means studying functionals N satisfying the specification:
(∀Y : [0, 1]→ N)(N(Y )(0) 6=R N(Y )(1) ∧ Y (N(Y )(0)) = Y (N(Y )(1))). (NIN(N))
In a nutshell, N(Y ) = (x, y) computes the real numbers claimed to exist by NIN. As
to precedent, the functional N is a special case of Luckhardt’s continuity indicators
from [56, p. 243] which have the same functionality.
Interpreting ‘computation’ as in Kleene’s S1-S9 ([45, 55]), we show that N as in
NIN(N) cannot be computed by any of the aforementioned ‘comprehension’ func-
tionals S2k that give rise to Z
ω
2 . By contrast, the number y in Theorem 1.1 is outright
(and efficiently) computable from the other data ([33, 82]).
In light of the above, the logical and computational properties of NIN expressed
in terms of comprehension are rather unsatisfactory. Indeed, the systems Zω2 and
ZΩ2 are both conservative extensions of Z2, but the former cannot prove NIN while
the latter can. A similar phenomenon occurs for the computational properties of
NIN as captured by the functional N satisfying NIN(N) in Kleene’s higher-order
framework. It would be desirable to have a scale in which an intuitively6 ‘weak’
principle like NIN also falls into the formal ‘weak’ category, and the same for the
functional N as in NIN(N). The latter is strongly non-normal as in Footnote 1.
The reason for the discrepancy in the previous paragraph is that we are com-
paring apples and oranges. Indeed, the functionals S2k from Z
ω
2 and ∃
3 from ZΩ2
are ‘normal’, i.e. they imply the existence of (and even compute) a discontinuous
function (say on 2N). By contrast, NIN and the functional N from NIN(N) are
‘non-normal’, implying that they do not yield the existence of (let alone compute)
discontinuous functions. It is an empirical observation (see [64–69]) that measuring
the strength of non-normal objects and principles via normal objects and principles
always leads to the same unsatisfactory picture as in the previous paragraph based
on Zω2 and Z
Ω
2 in which intuitively ‘weak’ principles are not assigned the formal
‘weak’ category. We provide a solution to all these problems in the next section.
1.3.3. The uncountability of R and the non-normal world. In this section, we sketch
part of the non-normal world from [75], and the place of NIN within it. Definitions
for principles like BOOT, HBU, et cetera, may be found in Section 2.1.4. First of
all, consider the following implications, some of which are well-known.
ACA0 →WKL0 →WWKL0 → RCA0 and BOOT→ HBU→WHBU → RCA
ω
0 (P)
6For instance, NIN does not imply any principle from the RM zoo ([23]). Our below results
combined with [53, Theorem 3] show NIN yields a conservative extension of arithmetical compre-
hension, as provided by Feferman’s µ-operator from Section 2.1.4.
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The following crucial metamathematical properties (a) and (b) about (P) are shown
in [75]. The ECF-translation is the canonical embedding of higher-order into second-
order arithmetic, as discussed in Remark 2.3.
(a) The ECF-translation maps the implications on the right of (P) to the im-
plications on the left of (P).
(b) Under ECF, equivalences to principles on the right of (P) are mapped to:
equivalences to principles on the left of (P).
Thus, item (a) establishes that the right-hand side consists of non-normal principles,
as ECF maps the existence of discontinuous functions to ‘0 = 1’. An example of
item (b) is as follows: BOOT is equivalent to a certain monotone convergence
theorem for nets; ECF translates this equivalence to the well-known equivalence
between ACA0 and the monotone convergence theorem for sequences ([82, III.2]).
In light of (P) and items (a) and (b), the second-order world (involving ACA0
and weaker principles) is a reflection7 of the non-normal world under ECF. Similar
results hold for ATR0 and Π
1
1 -CA0, as proved in [75, §4]. As expected, Z
ω
2 cannot
prove BOOT as in (P), but ZΩ2 can. The non-normal world as in (P) is (a small part
of) a hierarchy based on the neighbourhood function principle (NFP; see [75, §5]
and Section 3.2), a classically valid continuity axiom from Brouwer’s intuitionistic
mathematics ([91]). For the purposes of this paper, BOOT and (P) are sufficient.
Indeed, the following figure provides an overview of some of the results for NIN
and variations. Further definitions can be found in Section 2.1.4 while implications
not involving NIN or NBI are in [66–69,75].
cocode0 BOOT
− BOOT ZΩ2
BW0 Lebesgue0 Σ-NFP HBU BCT Z
ω
2
HBC0 Lebesgue
′
0 NCC WHBU Arz
BW1 HBC1 NIN Arz
−
cocode1 ∆-CA NBI
(+ACA)
(+WKL)
/
\
\\/
(+WKL)(+ACA) /
Figure 1. The non-normal world between BOOT and NBI
We point out that Arz is Arzela`’s convergence theorem for the Riemann integral,
published in 1885 ([1]), i.e. ordinary mathematics if ever there was such. Curiously,
Arz−, i.e. Arz formulated with Tao’s metastability in the conclusion, still implies
NIN. Moreover, Figure 1 is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg: Appendix A
contains more than a dozen basic theorems that imply NIN or NBI. We also single
out cocodei from Figure 1 as it expresses that the word ‘countable’ has the same
meaning in RM and in mainstream mathematics, i.e. this ‘coding principle’ seems
7Many such ‘reflections’ as in items (a) and (b) exist: the interested reader will verify that
ECF maps both BW0 → HBC0 → NIN and BW1 → HBC1 → NBI to ACA0 →WKL0 → RCA0.
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crucial to anyone seeking to interpret the results of RM in a more general context.
Here, Lebesgue0 states a countable set has Lebesgue measure zero, while Lebesgue
′
0 is
the Lebesgue criterion for Riemann integrability restricted to countable sets. Also,
HBCi captures the well-known Heine-Borel theorem for countable coverings, where
‘countable’ has its usual definition, as explored in Sections 3.1.4 and 3.2.2. Curi-
ously, these ‘countable’ results are proved using HBU→ NIN, where the antecedent
is the uncountable Heine-Borel theorem. Similarly, BWi is the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem providing suprema for countable sets in [0, 1]. At the very least, these
observations call for a thorough investigation of the role of ‘countable set’ in RM.
Moreover, the negative results in Figure 1 do not change if we add countable
choice as in QF-AC0,1 to Zω2 , except for the arrow that is crossed out twice. We
stress that the functionals S2k used to define Z
ω
2 are third-order objects and that NIN
and NBI are part of the language of third-order arithmetic. By contrast, Kleene’s
∃3 used to define ZΩ2 , is fundamentally fourth-order in nature.
Finally, we believe the topic of this paper, namely what are the logical and
computational properties of the uncountability of R, to be of general interest to
any audience of mathematicians as we identify surprising results about a very well-
studied topic in the foundations of mathematics, namely the genesis of set theory.
Beyond this, we have formulated the below proofs in such a way as to appeal to
an as broad as possible audience. In particular, the below is meant to showcase the
techniques used to establish the results in [66–69], which are part of our ongoing
project on the logical and computational properties of the uncountable. Indeed,
NIN is implied by most of the (third-order) principles we have hitherto studied, e.g.
the Lindelo¨f lemma and the Heine-Borel (HBU), Vitali (WHBU), and Baire category
(BCT) theorems. Our results for NIN and NBI imply that all stronger principles
behave in the same way, as depicted in Figure 1.
2. Two frameworks
We introduce Reverse Mathematics in Section 2.1, as well as Kohlenbach’s gen-
eralisation to higher-order arithmetic, and the associated base theory RCAω0 . We in-
troduce higher-order computability theory, following Kleene’s computation schemes
S1-S9, in Section 2.2. Based on this framework, we obtain some model constructions
(Section 2.2.4) that are essential to our independence results in Section 3.
2.1. Reverse Mathematics. We provide an introduction to Reverse Mathematics
(Section 2.1.1) and introduce Kohlenbach’s base theory of higher-order Reverse
Mathematics (Section 2.1.2). Some essential axioms, functionals, and notations
may be found in Sections 2.1.3 and 2.1.4.
2.1.1. Introduction. Reverse Mathematics (RM hereafter) is a program in the foun-
dations of mathematics initiated around 1975 by Friedman ([28,29]) and developed
extensively by Simpson ([82]). The aim of RM is to identify the minimal axioms
needed to prove theorems of ordinary, i.e. non-set theoretical, mathematics.
We refer to [85] for a basic introduction to RM and to [81,82] for an overview of
RM. We expect basic familiarity with RM, but do sketch some aspects of Kohlen-
bach’s higher-order RM ([49]) essential to this paper, including the base theory
RCAω0 (Definition 2.1).
8 ON THE UNCOUNTABILITY OF R
First of all, in contrast to ‘classical’ RM based on second-order arithmetic Z2,
higher-order RM uses Lω, the richer language of higher-order arithmetic. Indeed,
while the former is restricted to natural numbers and sets of natural numbers,
higher-order arithmetic can accommodate sets of sets of natural numbers, sets of
sets of sets of natural numbers, et cetera. To formalise this idea, we introduce the
collection of all finite types T, defined by the two clauses:
(i) 0 ∈ T and (ii) If σ, τ ∈ T then (σ → τ) ∈ T,
where 0 is the type of natural numbers, and σ → τ is the type of mappings from
objects of type σ to objects of type τ . In this way, 1 ≡ 0 → 0 is the type of
functions from numbers to numbers, and n+ 1 ≡ n→ 0. Viewing sets as given by
characteristic functions, we note that Z2 only includes objects of type 0 and 1.
Secondly, the language Lω includes variables x
ρ, yρ, zρ, . . . of any finite type
ρ ∈ T. Types may be omitted when they can be inferred from context. The
constants of Lω include the type 0 objects 0, 1 and <0,+0,×0,=0 which are intended
to have their usual meaning as operations on N. Equality at higher types is defined
in terms of ‘=0’ as follows: for any objects x
τ , yτ , we have
[x =τ y] ≡ (∀z
τ1
1 . . . z
τk
k )[xz1 . . . zk =0 yz1 . . . zk], (2.1)
if the type τ is composed as τ ≡ (τ1 → . . . → τk → 0). Furthermore, Lω also
includes the recursor constant Rσ for any σ ∈ T, which allows for iteration on type
σ-objects as in the special case (2.2). Formulas and terms are defined as usual.
One obtains the sub-language Ln+2 by restricting the above type formation rule to
produce only type n+ 1 objects (and related types of similar complexity).
2.1.2. The base theory of higher-order Reverse Mathematics. We introduce Kohlen-
bach’s base theory RCAω0 , first introduced in [49, §2].
Definition 2.1. The base theory RCAω0 consists of the following axioms.
(a) Basic axioms expressing that 0, 1, <0,+0,×0 form an ordered semi-ring with
equality =0.
(b) Basic axioms defining the well-known Π and Σ combinators (aka K and S
in [2]), which allow for the definition of λ-abstraction.
(c) The defining axiom of the recursor constant R0: for m
0 and f1:
R0(f,m, 0) := m and R0(f,m, n+ 1) := f(n,R0(f,m, n)). (2.2)
(d) The axiom of extensionality: for all ρ, τ ∈ T, we have:
(∀xρ, yρ, ϕρ→τ )
[
x =ρ y → ϕ(x) =τ ϕ(y)
]
. (Eρ,τ )
(e) The induction axiom for quantifier-free formulas of Lω.
(f) QF-AC1,0: the quantifier-free Axiom of Choice as in Definition 2.2.
Note that variables (of any finite type) are allowed in quantifier-free formulas of
the language Lω : only quantifiers are banned.
Definition 2.2. The axiom QF-AC consists of the following for all σ, τ ∈ T:
(∀xσ)(∃yτ )A(x, y)→ (∃Y σ→τ )(∀xσ)A(x, Y (x)), (QF-ACσ,τ )
for any quantifier-free formula A in the language of Lω.
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As discussed in [49, §2], RCAω0 and RCA0 prove the same sentences ‘up to lan-
guage’ as the latter is set-based and the former function-based. Recursion as in (2.2)
is called primitive recursion; the class of functionals obtained from Rρ for all ρ ∈ T
is called Go¨del’s system T of all (higher-order) primitive recursive functionals. Re-
lated to the aforementioned conservation result, we mention the ECF-interpretation.
Remark 2.3 (The ECF-interpretation). The (rather) technical definition of ECF
may be found in [90, p. 138, §2.6]. Intuitively, the ECF-interpretation [A]ECF of a
formula A ∈ Lω is just A with all variables of type two and higher replaced by
type one variables ranging over so-called ‘associates’ or ‘RM-codes’ (see [48, §4]);
the latter are (countable) representations of continuous functionals. The ECF-
interpretation connects RCAω0 and RCA0 (see [49, Prop. 3.1]) in that if RCA
ω
0 proves
A, then RCA0 proves [A]ECF, again ‘up to language’, as RCA0 is formulated using
sets, and [A]ECF is formulated using types, i.e. using type zero and one objects.
In light of the widespread use of codes in RM and the common practise of
identifying codes with the objects being coded, it is no exaggeration to refer to ECF
as the canonical embedding of higher-order into second-order arithmetic.
Finally as noted above, Theorem 1.1 is provable in the base theory.
Theorem 2.4 ([82, II.4.9]). The following is provable in RCA0. For any sequence
of real numbers (xn)n∈N, there is a real y different from xn for all n ∈ N.
2.1.3. Notations and the like. We introduce the usual notations for common math-
ematical notions, like real numbers, as also introduced in [49].
Definition 2.5 (Real numbers and related notions in RCAω0 ).
(a) Natural numbers correspond to type zero objects, and we use ‘n0’ and
‘n ∈ N’ interchangeably. Rational numbers are defined as signed quotients
of natural numbers, and ‘q ∈ Q’ and ‘<Q’ have their usual meaning.
(b) Real numbers are coded by fast-converging Cauchy sequences q(·) : N →
Q, i.e. such that (∀n0, i0)(|qn − qn+i| <Q
1
2n ). We use Kohlenbach’s ‘hat
function’ from [49, p. 289] to guarantee that every q1 defines a real number.
(c) We write ‘x ∈ R’ to express that x1 := (q1(·)) represents a real as in the
previous item and write [x](k) := qk for the k-th approximation of x.
(d) Two reals x, y represented by q(·) and r(·) are equal, denoted x =R y, if
(∀n0)(|qn − rn| ≤ 2−n+1). Inequality ‘<R’ is defined similarly. We some-
times omit the subscript ‘R’ if it is clear from context.
(e) Functions F : R → R are represented by Φ1→1 mapping equal reals to equal
reals, i.e. extensionality as in (∀x, y ∈ R)(x =R y → Φ(x) =R Φ(y)).
(f) The relation ‘x ≤τ y’ is defined as in (2.1) but with ‘≤0’ instead of ‘=0’.
Binary sequences are denoted ‘f1, g1 ≤1 1’, but also ‘f, g ∈ C’ or ‘f, g ∈ 2N’.
Elements of Baire space are given by f1, g1, but also denoted ‘f, g ∈ NN’.
(g) Sets of type ρ objects Xρ→0, Y ρ→0, . . . are given by their characteristic
functions F ρ→0X ≤ρ→0 1, i.e. we write ‘x ∈ X ’ for FX(x) =0 1.
For completeness, we list the following notational convention for finite sequences.
Notation 2.6 (Finite sequences). We assume a dedicated type for ‘finite sequences
of objects of type ρ’, namely ρ∗. Since the usual coding of pairs of numbers goes
through in RCAω0 , we shall not always distinguish between 0 and 0
∗. Similarly, we
do not always distinguish between ‘sρ’ and ‘〈sρ〉’, where the former is ‘the object
10 ON THE UNCOUNTABILITY OF R
s of type ρ’, and the latter is ‘the sequence of type ρ∗ with only element sρ’. The
empty sequence for the type ρ∗ is denoted by ‘〈〉ρ’, usually with the typing omitted.
Furthermore, we denote by ‘|s| = n’ the length of the finite sequence sρ
∗
=
〈sρ0, s
ρ
1, . . . , s
ρ
n−1〉, where |〈〉| = 0, i.e. the empty sequence has length zero. For
sequences sρ
∗
, tρ
∗
, we denote by ‘s∗t’ the concatenation of s and t, i.e. (s∗t)(i) = s(i)
for i < |s| and (s∗t)(j) = t(|s|−j) for |s| ≤ j < |s|+|t|. For a sequence sρ
∗
, we define
sN := 〈s(0), s(1), . . . , s(N − 1)〉 for N0 < |s|. For a sequence α0→ρ, we also write
αN = 〈α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N−1)〉 for any N0. By way of shorthand, (∀qρ ∈ Qρ
∗
)A(q)
abbreviates (∀i0 < |Q|)A(Q(i)), which is (equivalent to) quantifier-free if A is.
2.1.4. Some axioms and functionals. As noted in Section 1, the logical hardness of
a theorem is measured via what fragment of the comprehension axiom is needed
for a proof. For this reason, we introduce some axioms and functionals related to
higher-order comprehension in this section.
First of all, the following functional is clearly discontinuous at f = 11 . . . ; in
fact, (∃2) is equivalent to the existence of F : R → R such that F (x) = 1 if x >R 0,
and 0 otherwise ([49, §3]). This fact shall be repeated often.
(∃ϕ2 ≤2 1)(∀f
1)
[
(∃n)(f(n) = 0)↔ ϕ(f) = 0
]
. (∃2)
Related to (∃2), the functional µ2 in (µ2) is also called Feferman’s µ ([2]).
(∃µ2)(∀f1)
[
(∃n)(f(n) = 0)→ [f(µ(f)) = 0 ∧ (∀i < µ(f))(f(i) 6= 0)] (µ2)
∧ [(∀n)(f(n) 6= 0)→ µ(f) = 0]
]
,
We have (∃2) ↔ (µ2) over RCAω0 and ACA
ω
0 ≡ RCA
ω
0 + (∃
2) proves the same
sentences as ACA0 by [41, Theorem 2.5].
Secondly, the functional S2 in (S2) is called the Suslin functional ([49]).
(∃S2 ≤2 1)(∀f
1)
[
(∃g1)(∀n0)(f(gn) = 0)↔ S(f) = 0
]
, (S2)
The system Π11 -CA
ω
0 ≡ RCA
ω
0 + (S
2) proves the same Π13 -sentences as Π
1
1 -CA0 by
[73, Theorem 2.2]. By definition, the Suslin functional S2 can decide whether a
Σ11-formula as in the left-hand side of (S
2) is true or false. We similarly define the
functional S2k which decides the truth or falsity of Σ
1
k-formulas from L2; we also
define the system Π1k -CA
ω
0 as RCA
ω
0 + (S
2
k), where (S
2
k) expresses that S
2
k exists.
We note that the operators νn from [12, p. 129] are essentially S
2
n strengthened to
return a witness (if existant) to the Σ1k-formula at hand.
Thirdly, full second-order arithmetic Z2 is readily derived from ∪kΠ1k -CA
ω
0 , or from:
(∃E3 ≤3 1)(∀Y
2)
[
(∃f1)(Y (f) = 0)↔ E(Y ) = 0
]
, (∃3)
and we therefore define ZΩ2 ≡ RCA
ω
0 + (∃
3) and Zω2 ≡ ∪kΠ
1
k -CA
ω
0 , which are con-
servative over Z2 by [41, Cor. 2.6]. Despite this close connection, Z
ω
2 and Z
Ω
2 can
behave quite differently, as discussed in e.g. [66, §2.2]. The functional from (∃3) is
also called ‘∃3’, and we use the same convention for other functionals.
Fourth, the Heine-Borel theorem states the existence of a finite sub-covering
for an open covering of certain spaces. Now, a functional Ψ : R → R+ gives
rise to the canonical cover ∪x∈IIΨx for I ≡ [0, 1], where I
Ψ
x is the open interval
(x − Ψ(x), x + Ψ(x)). Hence, the uncountable covering ∪x∈IIΨx has a finite sub-
covering by the Heine-Borel theorem; in symbols:
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Definition 2.7. [HBU] (∀Ψ : R → R+)(∃y0, . . . , yk ∈ I)(∀x ∈ I)(∃i ≤ k)(x ∈ IΨyi).
Note that HBU is almost verbatim Cousin’s lemma (see [20, p. 22]), i.e. the
Heine-Borel theorem restricted to canonical covers. This restriction does not make
a difference, as studied in [79]. Let WHBU be the following weakening of HBU:
Definition 2.8. [WHBU] For any Ψ : R → R+ and ε >R 0, there are pairwise
distinct y0, . . . , yk ∈ I with 1− ε <R
∑
i≤k |J
Ψ
yi |, where J
Ψ
yi+1 := I
Ψ
yi+1 \ (∪j≤iI
Ψ
yi).
Note that WHBU expresses the essence of the Vitali covering theorem for un-
countable coverings; Vitali already considered the latter in [95]. By [66, 67, 69], ZΩ2
proves HBU and WHBU but Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1 cannot. Basic properties of the gauge
integral ([62, 86]) are equivalent to HBU while WHBU is equivalent to basic prop-
erties of the Lebesgue integral (without RM-codes; [67]). We note that HBU (resp.
WHBU) is the higher-order counterpart of WKL (resp. WWKL), i.e. weak Ko¨nig’s
lemma (resp. weak weak Ko¨nig’s lemma) from [82, IV and X] as ECF maps HBU
(resp. WHBU) to WKL (resp. WWKL), i.e. these are (intuitively) weak principles.
Finally, the aforementioned results suggest that (higher-order) comprehension
as in Π1k -CA
ω
0 is not the right way of measuring the strength of HBU. As a better
alternative, we have introduced the following axiom in [75].
Definition 2.9. [BOOT] (∀Y 2)(∃X1)(∀n0)
[
n ∈ X ↔ (∃f1)(Y (f, n) = 0)
]
.
By [75, §3], BOOT is equivalent to convergence theorems for nets, we have the
implication BOOT → HBU, and RCAω0 + BOOT has the same first-order strength
as ACA0. Moreover, BOOT is a natural fragment of Feferman’s projection axiom
(Proj1) from [25]. Thus, BOOT is a natural axiom that provides a better ‘scale’ for
measuring the strength of HBU and its ilk, as discussed in [75] and Section 1.3.3.
2.2. Higher-order computability theory.
2.2.1. Introduction. As noted above, some of our main results will be proved using
techniques from computability theory. Thus, we first make our notion of ‘com-
putability’ precise as follows.
(I) We adopt ZFC, i.e. Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the Axiom of Choice,
as the official metatheory for all results, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
(II) We adopt Kleene’s notion of higher-order computation as given by his nine
clauses S1-S9 (see [55, Ch. 5] or [45]) as our official notion of ‘computable’.
Similar to [64–69], one main aim of this paper is the study of functionals of type 3
that are natural from the perspective of mathematical practise.
We refer to [55] for a thorough and recent overview of higher-order computabil-
ity theory. We provide an intuitive introduction to S1-S9 in Section 2.2.2. We
also sketch one of our main techniques, called Gandy selection, in Section 2.2.3.
Intuitively speaking, this method expresses that S1-S9 computability satisfies an
effective version of the Axiom of Choice. Using this technique, we construct a num-
ber of models in Section 2.2.4 that establish our independence results in Section 3.
2.2.2. Kleene’s computation schemes. For those familiar with Turing computabil-
ity, Kleene’s S1-S9 in a nutshell is as follows: the schemes S1-S8 merely introduce
(higher-order) primitive recursion, while S9 essentially states that the recursion
theorem holds. In this section we will provide a slightly more detailed introduction
to Kleene computability. All further details can be found in [55, §5.1.4].
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Definition 2.10. A type structure Tp is a sequence {Tp[k]}k∈N as follows.
• Tp[0] = N.
• For all k ∈ N, Tp[k + 1] is a set of functions Φ : Tp[k]→ N.
As we will see, the Kleene schemes can be interpreted for all type structures.
One of our applications of type structures is that they will serve as models for
fragments of higher-order arithmetic, structures for the language Lω. While the
Kleene schemes are defined for pure types, the language Lω is over a richer set of
types, known as the finite types. However, assuming some modest closure properties
of a type structure Tp, the extension to the finite types is unique (see [55, §4.2]).
This is the case when Tp is Kleene closed as in Definition 2.12.
The following main definition is [55, Definition 5.1.1] adjusted to a type structure
Tp. We assume a standard sequence numbering over N: variables a, b, c, x, y, q,
e and d denote elements of N, while f , g, . . . denote elements of Tp[1]. We let
Φkii stand for an element of Tp[ki]. The index ‘e’ in (K) serves as a Go¨del number
denoting the e-th Kleene algorithm. We use the notation ‘{e}Tp’ if we need to
specify the particular type structure Tp.
Definition 2.11 (Kleene S1-S9 schemes relative to Tp). Let Tp = {Tp[k]}k∈N be
a type structure. Over the latter, we define the relation
{e}(Φk00 , . . . , Φ
kn−1
n−1 ) = a (K)
by a monotone inductive definition as follows. We omit the upper indices for the
types whenever they are clear from context.
S1 If e = 〈1〉, then {e}(x, ~Φ) = x+ 1.
S2 If e = 〈2, q〉, then {e}(~Φ) = q.
S3 If e = 〈3〉, then {e}(x, ~Φ) = x.
S4 If e = 〈4, e0, e1〉, then {e}(~Φ) = a if for some b we have that {e1}(~Φ) = b
and {e0}(b, ~Φ) = a.
S5 If e = 〈5, e0, e1〉 then
- {e}(0, ~Φ) = a if {e0}(~Φ) = a,
- {e}(x + 1, ~Φ) = a if there is some b such that {e}(x, ~Φ) = b and
{e1}(b, ~Φ) = a.
S6 If e = 〈6, d, π(0), . . . , π(n− 1)〉, where π is a permutation of {0, . . . , n− 1},
then {e}(Φ0, . . . , Φn−1) = a if {d}(Φpi(0), . . . , Φpi(n−1)) = a.
S7 If e = 〈7〉, then {e}(f, x, ~Φ) = f(x).
S8 If e = 〈8, d〉, then {e}(Φk+2, ~Φ) = a if there is a φk+1 ∈ Tp[k+1] such that
Φ(φ) = a and for all ξk ∈ Tp[k] we have that {d}(Φ, ξ, ~Φ) = φ(ξ).
S9 If e = 〈9,m+1〉 and m ≤ n, {e}(d, Φ0, . . . , Φn) = a if {d}(Φ0, . . . , Φm) = a.
Intuitively speaking, {e}(~Φ) = a represents the result of a terminating compu-
tation, where S1, S2, S3, and S7 provide us with the initial computation, S4 is
composition, S5 represents primitive recursion, and S6 represents permutations of
arguments. Finally, S8 represents higher-order-composition with two requirements :
that the computation of {d}(Φ, ξ, ~Φ) must terminate for all ξ ∈ Tp[k] and that the
functional φ thus computed must be an element of Tp[k+1]. In the original defini-
tion from [45], the schemes are interpreted over the maximal type structure and the
latter requirement is vacuous. This requirement is essential to our development, as
will become clear below.
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Definition 2.12 (Kleene computability).
(a) Let Tp be a type structure, let φ : Tp[k]→ N, and let ~Φ be in Tp as above.
We say that φ is Kleene computable in ~Φ (over Tp) if there is an index e
such that for all ξ ∈ Tp[k] we have that {e}(ξ, ~Φ) = φ(ξ).
(b) The type structure Tp is Kleene closed if for all k and all φ : Tp[k] → N
that are Kleene computable in elements in Tp, we have that φ ∈ Tp[k+1].
When a type structure Tp is Kleene closed, it will have a canonical extension to
an interpretation Tp[σ] for all finite types σ as in the language Lω. This is folklore
and is discussed at length in [55, §4.2]. We use Tp∗ to denote this unique extension.
What is important to us is that if Tp is Kleene closed, then Tp∗ is a model of RCAω0
and all terms in Go¨del’s T have canonical interpretations in Tp∗.
Next, we motivate our choice of framework as follows.
Remark 2.13 (Church-Turing-Kleene). First of all, there is no ‘Church-Turing
thesis’ for higher-order computability theory: there are several competing concepts
based on µ-computability, fixed point constructors, partial functionals, and so forth.
We refer to [55] for a detailed overview. We have primarily used Kleene’s concept
because it has proved to be useful in the construction of structures for extensions
of RCAω0 , proving theorems of logical independence.
Secondly, as a kind of ‘dichotomy phenomenon’, we have observed that when
we prove that one object of interest is computable in another object of interest,
we can usually do this within Go¨del’s T , or even with a weaker notion of relative
computability. By contrast, when we prove a non-computability result, we can do
this for the (relatively strong) concept of Kleene computability, but not necessarily
for stronger concepts.
Finally, we discuss some aspects of Kleene computability essential to this paper
while foregoing a full introduction. For instance, we will not prove that being
computable in is transitive, while we freely use this fact. We do discuss two folklore
results (Lemmas 2.14 and 2.15) and one important theorem (Theorem 2.16).
First of all, since the relation {e}(~Φ) = a is defined by a positive inductive
definition, all such computation tuples 〈e, ~Φ, a〉 will either stem from one of the
schemes S1, S2, S3 or S7, or there will be a unique base of other such computation
tuples. The elements of this base are called the immediate sub-computations and
the transitive closure of this relation gives us the well-founded relation of being a
sub-computation. The list of arguments in a sub-computation may contain more
objects, but as they are only added through the use of S8, they will only be two
type levels (or more) below the maximal type in the original list. In particular this
means that if all arguments in a computation {e}(~Φ) = a are of type 2 or lower,
all extra arguments in the sub-computations will be integers. This further means
that in a computation like this, say of the form {e}(~F , ~f,~a) = b, where each Fi is of
type 2, whenever we use the value Fi(g) in a sub-computation based on S8, g itself
will be computable in the argument list. For the sake of notational simplicity, we
often order the arguments of a computation according to their types.
Lemma 2.14 (Restriction). Let A ⊆ NN and consider F : NN → N with its
restriction to A denoted FA. If all f computable in F and elements in A are in A,
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then for all indices e, for all ~f from A and all ~a we have that
{e}(F, ~f,~a) ≃ {e}(FA, ~f,~a)
where ‘≃’ is the Kleene-equality: both sides are either undefined or both sides are
defined and equal.
We also have the following lemma, combining the observation of Lemma 2.14
with the transitivity of the relation computable in.
Lemma 2.15 (Sandwich). Let F,G : NN → N and assume that there is a partial
functional H ⊆ G that is partially computable in F and total on the set of functions
computable in F . Then all functions computable in G are computable in F .
Secondly, the following theorem shows that we have a high degree of flexibility
when defining type structures from sets of functionals.
Theorem 2.16. Let A ⊆ NN and let B be a set of functionals F : A→ N. Assume
that all f computable in a sequence from B and A are in A. Then there is a Kleene
closed type structure Tp such that A = Tp[1] and B ⊆ Tp[2].
Proof. We define Tp[k] by recursion on k as follows:
• Tp[0] = N
• Tp[k + 1] is the set of functionals Φ : Tp[k] → N that are computable over
{Tp[i]}i≤k in a finite sequence from A and B.
Since sub-computations only involve extra arguments of lower types, computability
over {Tp[i]}i≤k will be the same as computability over Tp, and since computable in
is transitive, Tp will be Kleene closed. 
The fan functional is a non-normal object computing a modulus of uniform
continuity for continuous inputs ([55, §8.3]).
Corollary 2.17. There is a Kleene closed type structure Tp such that Tp[1] satisfies
ACA0, but with no fan functional in Tp[3].
Proof. Let A be the set of arithmetically defined functions and B be empty. Since
the fan functional is not Kleene computable in any function ([55, §8.3]), the type
structure derived from the proof of Theorem 2.16 will have this property. 
All elements in Tp[2] in the proof are continuous with an associate in Tp[1].
Moreover, there is a Kleene closed type structure Tp′ containing all of NN, but
not the fan functional, by the same argument. In this case, Tp′[2] are exactly the
continuous functionals, implying that the fan functional is total, but not in Tp′[3].
2.2.3. Gandy selection. We discuss Gandy selection, a technique expressing that
Kleene computability satsifies a kind of ‘computable Axiom of Choice’. This tech-
nique is based on stage comparison, discussed next.
Now, given a type structure Tp, Kleene computations are defined by a positive
inductive definition and the set of computations {e}(~Φ) = a are equipped with
ordinal ranks. Moreover, if the elements of ~Φ have types ≤ 2, this ordinal rank is
countable, which holds for any Kleene closed type structure.
Definition 2.18 (Norm of a computation). If {e}(F, ~f,~a) terminates, we let the
ordinal ||〈e, F, ~f ,~a〉|| denote the norm. If the computation does not terminate, we
set the norm to ∞, or equivalently in this context, to ℵ1.
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Recall the functional ∃2 introduced in Section 2.1.4. A functional F of type 2 is
called normal if ∃2 is computable in F , a definition that works for all Kleene closed
type structures. If F is normal, we can use ∃2 and the recursion theorem to prove
the following theorem, originally due to Gandy [30].
Theorem 2.19 (Stage comparison). If F 2 is normal, there is an F -computable
function P such that if {e}(F, ~f,~a) and {d}(F,~g,~b) are two alleged computations,
then P (〈e, ~f ,~a, d,~g,~b〉) terminates if and only if at least one of the two alleged
computations terminate, and then P decides if ||〈F, ~f ,~a〉|| < ||〈F,~g,~b〉|| or not.
A ‘soft’ consequence of stage comparison is Gandy selection, first proved in [30].
We only state the version we need in this paper. Intuitively, λf.{d}(F, f) is a
(partial) choice function with the biggest possible domain.
Theorem 2.20 (Gandy Selection). Let F 2 be normal. Let A ⊂ N × NN and e be
such that (a, f) ∈ A if and only if {e}(F, f, a) terminates (A is semi-computable
in F ). Then there is an index d such that {d}(F, f) terminates if and only if there
exists a ∈ N such that (a, f) ∈ A, and then {d}(F, f) is one of these numbers.
Proof. The proof makes use of the recursion theorem, and the idea is first to select
the nonempty computable set of those a leading to a computation {e}(F, f, a) of
minimal ordinal rank, and then to select the least a among those. We omit further
details and refer to [55, §5.4] instead. 
Most of our applications of Gandy selection are based on the following corollary.
Intuitively speaking, the functional G computes an F -index for f .
Corollary 2.21. Let F 2 be normal. Then there is a partial functional G computable
in F which terminates if and only if the input f is computable in F , and such that
we have G(f) = e→ (∀a)(f(a) = {e}(F, a)).
Proof. When F is normal, the relation (∀a ∈ N)(f(a) = {e}(F, a)) is clearly
semi-computable, and we can apply Gandy Selection. 
Note that the functional G is always injective. Of course, these results are equally
valid for all Kleene closed type structures, and we may replace NN in Theorem 2.20
with any finite product of N and NN.
2.2.4. Two type structures. In this section, we define two Kleene closed type struc-
tures P and Q that are crucial for the below independence results involving Zω2 .
Moreover, the construction of Q unifies constructions from earlier work that were
used to prove e.g. [64, Theorem 3.4], [69, Theorem 4.9], and [68, Theorem 3.5].
We note that P is constructed under the set-theoretical assumption that V = L.
There is no harm in this, since what is of interest is the logic of the structure,
which statements are true and which are false, and our conservation results will not
depend on the assumption that V = L; they are proved within ZF.
Recall the functionals S2k from Section 2.1.4. We use the assumption V = L
motivated by the following fact from set theory.
Lemma 2.22 (V = L). Let A ⊆ NN be closed under computability relative to all
S2k. Then all Π
1
n-formulas are absolute for A for all n.
Proof. For n ≤ 2, this is a general fact independent of the assumption V = L, and
for n > 2 it is a consequence of the existence of a ∆12-well-ordering of N
N. 
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Definition 2.23 (V = L). Let S2ω be the join of all the functionals S
2
k, and let P
be the Kleene closed type-structure, as obtained from Theorem 2.16, where P[1] is
the set of functions computable in S2ω and the restriction of S
2
ω to P[1] is in P[2].
The model P, under another name, has been used to prove [69, Theorem 4.3].
Recall the unique extension Tp∗ of Tp introduced below Definition 2.12.
Lemma 2.24. P∗ derived from P as defined above is a model for Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1.
Proof. We assume that V = L, which implies that all Π1n-formulas are absolute for
P[1]. Since P[1] is closed under computability relative to each S2k, we have that
P[1] satisfies all Π1n-comprehension axioms. Now assume that (∀n
0)(∃f1)Q(n, f, ~Φ)
is true in P, where Q is quantifier-free and ~Φ is a list of parameters from P. Since
all functionals in ~Φ are computable in S2ω, the set
R = {(n, e) ∈ N2 : (∃f1)[Q(n, f, ~Φ) ∧ (∀a0)(f(a) = {e}(Sω2 , a))]}
is semi-computable in S2ω. Moreover, we have that (∀n
0)(∃e0)[(n, e) ∈ R]. By
assumption and Gandy selection, there is a function g computable in S2ω such that
R(n, g(n)) for all n0. If G(n) is the function f computed from S2ω with index g(n),
we have that G0→1 ∈ P witnesses this instance of quantifier-free choice. 
For the rest of this section, we fix some notation. We let A ⊆ NN be a countable
set such that all Π1n formulas are absolute for (A,N
N) for all n. We let A = {gk :
k ∈ N} and we let Ak be the set of functions computable in S
2
k and g0, . . . , gk−1. For
the sake of unity, we put S20 = ∃
2, so A0 is the set of hyperarithmetical functions.
Lemma 2.25. Each Ak is a subset of A. Moreover, for each k, Ak is a proper
subset of Ak+1 and Ak+1 contains an element hk that enumerates Ak.
Proof. This follows from the choice of A and the fact that the relation
{e}(S2k, g0, . . . , gk−1,~a) = b
is Π1k+1 (for k > 0 even ∆
1
k+1) and that S
2
k+1 computes an enumeration of all
functions computable in S2k relative to any fixed list of type 1 arguments. 
Now fix F : A→ N. We intend to use Theorem 2.16 and let F ∈ B0 if there is a
k0 such that for all k ≥ k0, the restriction of F to Ak is partially computable in S
2
k
and g0, . . . , gk−1. Note that the join of finitely many functionals from B0 is in B0.
Lemma 2.26. If F ∈ B0 and f is computable from F and elements ~f in A, then
f ∈ A. Moreover S2k restricted to A is in B0.
Proof. For the first item, choose k0 for F and k ≥ k0 so large that ~f is a sequence
from Ak. By Lemma 2.15 we have that f ∈ Ak. For l ≥ k we have that S
2
k restricted
to Al is computable in S
2
l . This shows the second item. 
Definition 2.27. LetQ be the Kleene closed typed structure obtained by applying
Theorem 2.16 to A and B0 as given above.
Recall the unique extension Tp∗ of Tp introduced below Definition 2.12. The
type structure Q∗ is then a model for Zω2 since all Π
1
k -statements are absolute for
A for all k. In the next section, we show that Q∗ does not satisfy QF-AC0,1, while
we use Q to show that Zω2 is consistent with ¬NBI (see Theorem 3.21).
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3. The uncountability of R in Reverse Mathematics
We study the uncountability of R, as expressed by NIN and NBI, within the
framework of higher-order RM, as was sketched in Section 2.1. Independence results
shall be proved using the models from Section 2.2.4.
3.1. The principle NIN. We establish the properties of NIN summarised in Fig-
ure 1. In terms of comprehension and normal functionals, we show that NIN is
not provable in Zω2 but provable in Z
Ω
2 , where the latter two are both conserva-
tive extensions of Z2 (Section 3.1.1). On the other hand, NIN already follows from
rather basic (non-normal) mathematical facts, including well-known covering theo-
rems (Heine-Borel, Lindelo¨f, and Vitali) about uncountable coverings and a version
of the Baire category theorem (Section 3.1.2). In this way, the negative results
concerning e.g. HBU and WHBU from [66–68] follow from the properties of NIN
proved in this paper. We also derive NIN from basic properties of the Riemann
integral (Theorem 3.4, Arzela` 1885 [1]), metric spaces (Section 3.1.3), and basic
theorems from RM concerning countable sets (Section 3.1.4). Another dozen of
basic theorems implying NIN are listed in Appendix A.
We stress8 the results in [49, §3] which establish the equivalence over RCAω0
between (∃2) and the existence of a discontinuous function on R. Since NIN is trivial
if all functions on R are continuous, we have ¬NIN → (∃2) (by contraposition), a
fact we will often make use of without further comment.
3.1.1. Comprehension and NIN. In this section, we show that NIN relates to com-
prehension as follows. Recall that Zω2 and Z
Ω
2 are conservative extensions of Z2.
Theorem 3.1. Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1 cannot prove NIN, while ZΩ2 + QF-AC
0,1 can.
Proof. For the negative result, we use the model P from Definition 2.23. This model
satisfies Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1. We observe that P[2] contains a functional G : A → N
that is injective, which is a direct consequence of Corollary 2.21 using S2ω for F .
For the positive result, fix Y : [0, 1] → N and consider the following formula,
which is trivial under classical logic:
(∀n ∈ N)(∃y ∈ [0, 1])
[
(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n)→ Y (y) = n
]
. (3.1)
Note that QF-AC0,1 applies to (3.1) (modulo ∃3) and let Φ0→1 be the resulting
sequence, which obviously lists the range of Y . Using [82, II.4.9], let y ∈ [0, 1] be a
real number such that y 6=R Φ(n) for all n ∈ N. For n0 := Y (y), we have y 6=R Φ(n0)
while Y (y) = n0 = Y (Φ(n0)), i.e. NIN follows. 
An elementary argument allows us to replace (∃3) by BOOT and restrict to the
Axiom of unique Choice in the previous, but we obtain a much sharper proof in
Theorem 3.2; the theorem holds if we restrict NIN to measurable functionals. The
proof also establishes that the Axiom of Countable Choice suffices to prove NIN,
while the same holds for (many?) other fragments, like HR35 and HR38 from [38].
8For reasons unbeknownst to us, this result is confused (even by self-declared experts) with
another of Kohlenbach’s results from [49] pertaining to countable choice and sequential continuity.
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3.1.2. Ordinary mathematics and NIN. In this section, we derive NIN from weak9
theorems of ordinary mathematics, including Arzela`’s convergence theorem Arz.
We also note that countable choice as in QF-AC0,1 is not needed to prove NIN.
Let BCT be the Baire category theorem for open sets given by characteristic
functions as in [68, §6]. The following proof still goes through if we further restrict
BCT to open sets with at most finitely many isolated points in the complement.
Theorem 3.2. The system RCAω0 proves WHBU→ NIN← BCT.
Proof. For the first result, let Y : [0, 1] → N be an injection, i.e. we have that
(∀x, y ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) =0 Y (y) → x =R y). Now consider the uncountable covering
∪x∈[0,1]B(x,
1
2Y (x)+3
) of [0, 1]. Since Y is an injection, we have
∑
i≤k |B(xi,
1
2Y (xi)+3
)| ≤∑
i≤k
1
2i+2 ≤
1
2 for any finite sequence x0, . . . , xk of distinct reals in [0, 1]. In this
light, WHBU is false and we obtain WHBU → NIN, as required.
For the second part, let Y : [0, 1] → N again be an injection. Now define
On = {x ∈ [0, 1] : Y (x) > n} and note that since the complement of each On is
finite, each On is open and dense. Moreover, {(n, x) : x ∈ On} is definable from Y
by a term in Go¨del’s T , so this is a countable sequence of dense, open sets in [0, 1].
The intersection is empty and BCT thus fails; BCT→ NIN now follows. 
We note that the Heine-Borel and Vitali theorems for countable coverings sim-
ilarly imply NIN, as shown in Section 3.1.4. Since BCT for open sets given as
countable unions (aka RM-codes) is provable in RCA0 ([82, II.4.10]), NIN also fol-
lows from the ‘coding principle’ that expresses that a sequence of open sets given
by characteristic functions as in [68, §6] can be expressed as a sequence of RM-
codes of open sets. Moreover, the second part of this proof can be combined with
Lemma 2.15 to yield a simpler proof of [68, Theorem 6.6] as done in Theorem 4.4.
As noted above and in [67], WHBU constitutes the combinatorial essence of the
Vitali covering theorem. The former is equivalent to fundamental properties of the
Lebesgue measure, like countable additivity, over a slight extension of RCAω0 to
accommodate basic measure theory ([67]). In Section A, we list some very basic
properties of the Lebesgue measure and integral that imply NIN. Amuch more basic
‘integral’ theorem that implies NIN is provided by Arzela`’s convergence theorem for
the Riemann integral, first published in 1885 ([1]) and discussed in (historical) detail
in [34, 57]. The proof in [89] readily yields Arz in ZΩ2 , using HBU.
Principle 3.3 (Arz). Let f and (fn)n∈N be Riemann integrable on the unit interval
and such that limn→∞ fn(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1]. If there is M ∈ N such that
|fn(x)| ≤M +1 for all n ∈ N and x ∈ [0, 1], then limn→∞
∫ 1
0
fn(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx.
As is clear from its proof, the following theorem does not change if we require
a modulus of convergence for limn→∞ fn = f , (universal) moduli of Riemann inte-
grability, or if we assume the sequence λn.
∫ 1
0 fn(x)dx to be given.
Theorem 3.4. The system RCAω0 proves Arz → NIN.
Proof. Let Y : [0, 1] → N be an injection, define f as the constant 1 function, and
define fn(x) :=
∑
i≤n gi(x), where gi(x) = 1 if Y (x) = i and 0 otherwise. Note that
9When added to RCAω0 , e.g. WHBU and BCT from Theorem 3.2 do not increase the first-order
strength of the former. The results in [53, Theorem 3] show that WHBU yields a conservative
extension of arithmetical comprehension, as provided by Feferman’s µ from Section 2.1.4.
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fn(x) can only be 0 or 1. Moreover fn(x) = 1 for n ≥ Y (x), i.e. limn→∞ fn = f
(with a modulus of convergence). Clearly, f is Riemann integrable on the unit
interval, while the same holds for fn for fixed n. Indeed, gi is either identical
0 or zero everywhere except at (the unique by assumption) x0 ∈ [0, 1] such that
Y (x0) = i, where gi(x0) = 1. Hence, fn(x) has at most n+1 points of discontinuity.
Clearly, we have
∫ 1
0
fn(x)dx = 0 and
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx = 1. All conditions of Arz are
satisfied, yielding 0 = limn→∞
∫ 1
0
fn(x)dx =
∫ 1
0
f(x)dx = 1, a contradiction. 
The following theorems yield NIN in the same way as for Arz in the previous proof.
• Arzela`’s lemma, called ‘Theorem B’ in [57] and ‘item 2’ in [32, Theorem 4].
• Luxemburg’s Fatou’s lemma for the Riemann integral as in [57, p. 977].
• Thomson’s monotone convergence theorem for the Riemann integral ([89]).
• The Carslaw and Young term-by-term Riemann integration theorems (see
[17, Theorem II] and [98]).
• Kestelman’s Cauchy-Riemann convergence theorem ([44, Theorem 2]).
• The above formulated using ‘continuous almost everywhere and bounded’
by Lebesgue’s criterion for Riemann integrability (see also Section 3.1.4).
• Helly’s convergence theorem for the Stieltjes integral ([35, VIII, p. 288]).
As discussed in [34, §4.4] in the context of Fourier series, Ascoli, Dini, and du Bois
Reymond already made use of term-by-term integration for the Riemann integral
involving discontinuous functions as early as 1874. Moreover, if one requires in
Helly’s selection theorem that the sub-sequence exhibits pointwise convergence (like
in the original [35, VII, p. 283]) and L1-convergence (like in HST in [52]), then this
version, which can be found in e.g. [4], implies NIN in the same way as in the
theorem. By contrast, Helly’s selection theorem involving codes (called HST in
[52]) is equivalent to ACA0.
The previous theorem has a rather remarkable corollary. Indeed, Tao’s notion
of metastability generally has nicer10 logical/computational properties than ‘usual’
convergence to a limit ([50, 87]). The situation is rather different for Arz.
Corollary 3.5. The theorem remains valid if we change the conclusion of Arz to:
• The limit limn→∞
∫ 1
0
fn(x)dx exists.
• The sequence λn.
∫ 1
0 fn(x)dx is metastable
11. (Arz−)
Proof. Let Y : [0, 1]→ N be an injection and let gi(x) and f(x) be as in the proof
of the theorem. Now define fn(x) as follows:
f2n+1(x) :=
{
1 0 ≤ x ≤ 14∑2n+1
i=0 gi(x) otherwise
and f2n(x) :=
{
1 78 ≤ x ≤ 1∑2n
i=0 gi(x) otherwise
.
In the same way as in the proof of the theorem, we have limn→∞ fn = f (with a
modulus of convergence),
∫ 1
0
f2n+1(x)dx =
1
4 , and
∫ 1
0
f2n(x)dx =
1
8 . Hence, any
one of the conditions of the corollary leads to a contradiction, and NIN follows. 
10As shown in [50, p. 31], a monotone sequence in the unit interval has an elementary com-
putable and uniform rate of metastability, provable in RCAω0 . By contrast, it follows from [82, III.2]
that ACA0 is equivalent to the convergence of monotone sequences in [0, 1].
11A sequence of real numbers (xn)n∈N is called metastable if it satisfies (∀ε > 0, g : N →
N)(∃N ∈ N)(∀n,m ∈ [N, g(N)])(|xn − xm| < ε).
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The previous proof goes through for g in the definition of metastability restricted
to constant functions (see e.g. [50, p. 499] for such results ‘in the wild’). Moreover,
the above results have clear implications for the ‘coding practise’ of RM, which we
shall however discuss elsewhere in detail.
Finally, on a conceptual note, a number of early critics (including Borel) of the
Axiom of Choice actually implicitly used this axiom in their work (see [26, p. 315]).
A similar observation can be made for NBI and NIN as follows: around 1874, Weier-
strass seems to have held the belief12 that there cannot be essential differences be-
tween infinite sets (see [26, p. 184]), although basic compactness results, pioneered
in part by Weierstrass himself, imply the uncountability of R.
3.1.3. Metric spaces and NIN. In this section, we derive NIN from a most basic
separability property of metrics on the unit interval.
Now, the study of metric spaces in RM proceeds -unsurprisingly- via codes,
namely a complete separable metric space is represented via a countable and dense
subset ([82, II.5.1]). It is then a natural question how hard it is to prove that this
countable and dense subset exists for the original/non-coded metric spaces. We
study the special case for metrics defined on the unit interval, as in Definition 3.6
and STS below, which implies NIN by Theorem 3.10.
Definition 3.6. A functional d : [0, 1]2 → R is a metric on the unit interval if it
satisfies the following properties for x, y, z ∈ [0, 1]:
(a) d(x, y) =R 0↔ x =R y,
(b) 0 ≤R d(x, y) =R d(y, x),
(c) d(x, y) ≤R d(x, z) + d(z, y).
We use standard notation like Bd(x, r) to denote {y ∈ [0, 1] : d(x, y) < r}.
Definition 3.7. [Countably-compact] The metric space ([0, 1], d) is countably-
compact if for any sequence (an)n∈N in [0, 1] and sequence of rationals (rn)n∈N such
that [0, 1] ⊂ ∪n∈NBd(an, rn), there is m ∈ N such that [0, 1] ⊂ ∪n≤mBd(an, rn).
We note that Definition 3.8 is used in constructive mathematics (see [92, Ch. 7,
Def. 2.2]). Our notion of separability is also implied by total boundedness as used in
RM (see [82, III.2.3] or [11, p. 53]). According to Simpson ([82, p. 14]), one cannot
speak at all about non-separable spaces in L2.
Definition 3.8. [Separability] A metric space ([0, 1], d) is separable if there is a
sequence (xn)n∈N in [0, 1] such that (∀x ∈ [0, 1], k ∈ N)(∃n ∈ N)(d(x, xn) <
1
2k
).
Principle 3.9 (STS). A countably-compact metric space ([0, 1], d) is separable.
Theorem 3.10. The system RCAω0 proves STS→ NIN.
Proof. Suppose Y : [0, 1]→ N is an injection and note that (∃2) follows by [49, §3].
Define d(x, y) := | 1
2Y (x)
− 1
2Y (y)
| in case x, y ∈ [0, 1] are non-zero. Define d(0, 0) := 0
and d(x, 0) = d(0, x) := 1
2Y (x)
for non-zero x ∈ [0, 1]. The first item in Definition 3.6
holds by the assumption on Y , while the other two items hold by definition.
The metric space ([0, 1], d) is countably-compact as 0 ∈ Bd(x, r) implies y ∈
Bd(x, r) for y ∈ [0, 1] with only finitely many exceptions (due to Y being an injec-
tion). Let (xn)n∈N be the sequence provided by STS, implying (∀x ∈ [0, 1](∃n ∈
12Weierstrass seems to have changed his mind by 1885, which he expressed in a letter to
Mittag-Leffler (see [26, p. 185]).
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N)(d(x, xn) <
1
2Y (x)+1
) (by taking k = Y (x) + 1). The latter formula implies (∀x ∈
[0, 1](∃n ∈ N)(| 1
2Y (x)
− 1
2Y (xn)
| < 1
2Y (x)+1
) by definition. Clearly, | 1
2Y (x)
− 1
2Y (xn)
| <
1
2Y (x)+1
is only possible if Y (x) = Y (xn), implying x =R xn. Hence, we have shown
that (xn)n∈N lists all reals in the unit interval. By [82, II.4.9], there is y ∈ [0, 1]
such that y 6= xn for all n ∈ N (in RCA0). This contradiction implies NIN. 
Corollary 3.11. The theorem still goes through upon replacing ‘separable’ in STS
by any of the following.
(a) Total boundedness as in [82, III.2.3] or [11, p. 53].
(b) The Heine-Borel property for uncountable covers.
(c) The Lindelo¨f property for uncountable covers.
(d) The Vitali covering property as in WHBU for uncountable Vitali covers.
Proof. For item (b), fix an injection Y : [0, 1]→ N and let d be the metric as in the
proof of the theorem. Then Bd(x, r) = {x} for r > 0 small enough and x ∈ (0, 1].
In particular, the uncountable covering ∪x∈[0,1]Bd(x,
1
2Y (x)+1
) of [0, 1] cannot have
a finite (or countable) sub-cover, and NIN follows.
For item (d) (and item (c)), let Y and d be as in the previous paragraph and
note that ∪x∈[0,1]Bd(x,
1
2Y (x)+1
) is a Vitali cover. By the above, no finite sum can
be larger than 1/2, and we are done. 
It should also be straightforward to derive NIN from the non-separability of e.g.
the sequence space ℓ∞ or the space BV of functions of bounded variation.
3.1.4. Countable sets versus sets that are countable. We derive NIN from basic the-
orems about countable sets where the latter has its usual meaning, namely Defi-
nition 3.12 taken from [54]. In our hubristic opinion, these results firmly establish
the need to re-examine the entire RM-literature in light of the actual definition of
countable set. A cathartic response may be found in Section 3.2.
Among others, we study the Lebesgue criterion for Riemann integrability for
countable sets, as well as central theorems from RM concering countable sets as
in items (i)-(viii). In each case, NIN follows from these principles. By item (g) in
Definition 2.5, sets A ⊂ R are given by characteristic functions, as in [53, 67, 68].
Definition 3.12. [Countable subset of R] A set A ⊆ R is countable if there exists
Y : R → N such that (∀x, y ∈ A)(Y (x) =0 Y (y)→ x =R y).
This definition is from Kunen’s textbook on set theory ([54, p. 63]); we could
additionally require that Y : R → N in Definition 3.12 is also surjective, as in e.g.
[39]. This stronger notion is called ‘strongly countable’ (see Definition 3.25) and
studied in Section 3.2. If we replace ‘countable’ by ‘strongly countable’, all the
below proofs go through mutatis mutandis for NIN replaced by NBI.
Now, a cursory search reveals that the word ‘countable’ appears hundreds of
times in the ‘bible’ of RM [82]. Sections titles of [82] also reveal that the objects of
study are ‘countable’ rings, vector spaces, groups, et cetera. Of course, the above
definition of ‘countable subset of R’ cannot be expressed in L2. Indeed, all the
aforementioned objects are given by sequences in L2. Thus, the following ‘coding
principle’ cocode0 is crucial to RM if one wants the results in [82] to have the same
scope as third-order theorems about countable objects as in Definition 3.12.
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Definition 3.13. [cocode0] For any non-empty countable set A ⊆ [0, 1], there is a
sequence (xn)n∈N in A such that (∀x ∈ R)(x ∈ A↔ (∃n ∈ N)(xn =R x)).
Coding principles for continuous functions13 are used or studied in e.g. [48,68,76].
By Theorem 3.16, a lot of comprehension is needed to prove cocode0, but then the
latter is clearly non-normal. We also discuss the following basic theorems, which
have fairly trivial proofs when formulated in L2.
Definition 3.14. [Lebesgue0] A countable subset of [0, 1] has measure zero.
Note that the conclusion of this principle can be formulated without14 mentioning
the Lebesgue measure, like was done for WHBU. The following is a special case of
the Lebesgue criterion for the Riemann integral.
Definition 3.15. [Lebesgue′0] A bounded function f : [0, 1]→ R which is continuous
outside a countable subset of [0, 1], is Riemann integrable.
Now, the weakest comprehension principle that can prove cocode0 seems to be
BOOT− from [68], which is a weakening of BOOT via the following extra condition:
(∀n ∈ N)(∃ at most one f ∈ NN)(Y (f, n) = 0).
As discussed below, BOOT− follows from basic theorems on open sets as in [68].
Theorem 3.16. The system RCAω0 +WKL proves
BOOT− → cocode0 → Lebesgue0 → Lebesgue
′
0 → NIN, (3.2)
where WKL is only needed in the third implication.
Proof. First of all, we show BOOT− → NIN; repeating the proof with [0, 1] replaced
by A, one obtains BOOT− → cocode0. Let Y : [0, 1] → N be an injection and use
BOOT− to define X ⊂ N2×Q such that for all n,m ∈ N and q ∈ Q∩ [0, 1], we have:
(n,m, q) ∈ X ↔ (∃x ∈ B(q, 12m ) ∩ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n). (3.3)
Since Y is an injection, the following condition, required for BOOT−, is satisfied:
(∀n,m ∈ N, q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])(∃ at most one x ∈ B(q, 12m ) ∩ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n).
We now use X from (3.3) and the well-known interval-halving technique to create a
sequence (xn)n∈N. For fixed n ∈ N, define [xn](0) as 0 if (∃x ∈ [0, 1/2))(Y (x) = n),
and 1/2 otherwise; define [xn](m + 1) as [xn](m) if (∃x ∈
[
[xn](m), [xn](m) +
1
2m+1
))
(Y (x) = n), and [xn](m) +
1
2m+1 otherwise. By definition, we have:
(∀n ∈ N)
[
(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n)↔ Y (xn) = n
]
.
Now use [82, II.4.9] to find y0 ∈ [0, 1] not in the sequence (xn)n∈N. Then n0 = Y (y0)
yields a contradiction as xn0 6=R y and Y (y0) = Y (xn0).
Secondly, for the implication cocode0 → Lebesgue0, given a countable set A and
a sequence (xn)n∈N listing its elements, consider In := (xn−
ε
2n+2 , xn+
ε
2n+2 ), which
are as required to show that A has measure 0.
13As an example, RCAω0 + WKL can prove the coding principle ‘coco’ that any third-order
function on 2N satisfying the usual definition of continuity, has an RM-code (see [48, §4]).
14For A ⊂ R, let ‘A has measure zero’ mean that for any ε > 0, there is a sequence of closed
intervals
(
In
)
n∈N
covering A and such that ε >
∑∞
n=0 |Jn| for J0 := I0 and Ji+1 := Ii+1\∪j≤iIj .
This is nothing more than the usual definition as used by Tao in e.g. [88, p. 19].
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Thirdly, for the implication Lebesgue0 → Lebesgue
′
0, the consequent is trivial in
case ¬(∃2), as all functions on [0, 1] are now continuous (see [49, §3]) and hence
Riemann integrable given WKL (see [82, IV.2] and [48, §4]). Hence, we may assume
(∃2) is given. Use the latter as in [48, §4] to show that the function f : [0, 1]→ R as
in Lebesgue′0 has a continuous modulus of continuity outside of A. This yields an
open covering of [0, 1] \ A, while Lebesgue0 provides an open covering of A. Both
coverings are given by sequences. The proof of [74, Theorem 10] is now readily
adapted to yield that f is Riemann integrable.
Fourth, let Y : [0, 1]→ N be an injection and note that A ≡ [0, 12 ] is countable by
Definition 3.12. Define f : [0, 1]→ R as 2 if x ∈ (12 , 1] and the indicator function of Q
otherwise. By Lebesgue′0, this function is Riemann integrable, a contradiction. 
We now formulate a nice corollary involving cocode0 and its ilk restricted to
closed sets as used in RM. Now, open sets are given in RM by unions ∪n∈N(an, bn)
([82, II.5.6]), while closed sets are complements thereof. We refer to such sets as
‘RM-open’ and ‘RM-closed’. By the following corollary, Zω2 +QF-AC
0,1 cannot prove
that countable RM-closed sets are given by a sequence.
Corollary 3.17. The restriction of cocode0, Lebesgue0, or Lebesgue
′
0 to RM-closed
sets A ⊂ R still implies NIN.
Proof. Assume cocode0 for RM-closed sets A ⊂ R and let Y : [0, 1] → N be an
injection. The set [0, 1] is clearly RM-closed, as well as countable in the sense of
Definition 3.12. Hence, there is a sequence (xn)n∈N listing all elements of [0, 1]. By
[82, II.4.9], there is y ∈ [0, 1] such that (∀n ∈ N)(xn 6=R y), a contradiction. The
other results follow in the same way. 
One can push the previous corollary even further as follows: NIN follows from
the statement an RM-closed and countable subset of R has measure < +∞. Other
theorems that imply NIN in the same way are as follows, where ‘countable’ is always
interpreted as in Definition 3.12.
(i) Heine-Borel theorem for countable collections of open intervals.
(ii) Vitali’s covering theorem for countable collections of open intervals.
(iii) Riemann integrable functions differing on countable sets have equal integral.
(iv) |b− a| is the measure of: [a, b] plus a countable set (cf. Footnote 14).
(v) Convergence theorems for nets in [0, 1] with countable index sets.
(vi) For a countable set, the Lebesgue integral of the indicator function is zero.
(vii) Ascoli-Arzela` theorem for countable sets of functions (see e.g. [27]).
(viii) Bolzano-Weierstrass: a countable set in [0, 1] has a supremum.
Regarding item (i), Borel in [9] uses ‘countable infinity of intervals’ and not ‘se-
quence of intervals’ in his formulation15 of the Heine-Borel theorem. Vitali similarly
talks about countable and uncountable ‘groups’ of intervals in [95]. As noted above,
we show in Section 3.2 that ‘strongly countable’ as in Definition 3.25, involving a
bijection, gives rise to similar results, but with NIN replaced by NBI. In our opin-
ion, these results firmly establish the need to re-examine the entire RM-literature
in light of Definitions 3.12 and 3.25.
As a corollary to Theorem 3.2, we now derive NIN from item (i) as follows.
15In fact, Borel’s proof of the Heine-Borel theorem in [9, p. 42] starts with: Let us enumerate
our intervals, one after the other, according to whatever law, but determined. He then proceeds
with the usual ‘interval-halving’ proof, similar to Cousin in [20].
24 ON THE UNCOUNTABILITY OF R
Definition 3.18. [HBC0] For countable A ⊂ R2 with (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃(a, b) ∈ A)(x ∈
(a, b)), there are (a0, b0), . . . (ak, bk) ∈ A with (∀x ∈ [0, 1])(∃i ≤ k)(x ∈ (ai, bi)).
Corollary 3.19. The system RCAω0 proves HBC0 → NIN.
Proof. Let Y : [0, 1] → N be an injection and note that [0, 1] is now countable
as in Definition 3.12. Fix Ψ : [0, 1] → R+ and define A as the countable set
{(x− Ψ(x), x + Ψ(x)) : x ∈ [0, 1]}. Applying HBC0, there is a finite sub-cover and
HBU follows. Since HBU→ WHBU, Theorem 3.2 yields NIN, a contradiction. 
If BW0 denotes item (viii) above, the ‘usual’ proof yields BW0 → HBC0, as
expected. The following corollary is immediate and shows the limitations of L2.
Corollary 3.20. The system Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1 cannot prove HBC0 or BW0.
We do not know of a conceptually pleasing16 axiom that yields ‘obvious’ equiv-
alences like e.g. HBC0 ↔ WKL0 and ACA0 ↔ BW0 when added to RCA
ω
0 . As will
become clear in Section 3.2, such an axiom does exist for strongly countable sets.
Finally, the topic of [68] is the study of the logical and computational theorems
of ordinary mathematics pertaining to open sets, where the latter are represented
by characteristic functions. Now follows a list of such theorems that imply BOOT−,
where ‘open’ or ‘closed’ set is to be interpreted as in [68].
(a) The perfect set theorem.
(b) The Cantor-Bendixson theorem.
(c) Any non-empty closed set C ⊆ R is located.
(d) open: any non-empty open set in R is a union of basic open balls.
(e) The Urysohn lemma for R.
In general, many theorems about open or closed sets as in [68] would imply the
coding principle open. Assuming NCC from Section 3.2.1, this also seems to be the
case for the Tietze extension theorem, as discussed in [70, §3]. Moreover, we could
restrict Lebesgue0 to closed sets and generalise WHBU to coverings of closed sets;
after this modification, the latter would imply the former.
3.2. The principle NBI. In this section, we establish the results pertaining to NBI
as summarised in Figure 1. Some of these results are variations of results about
NIN, while others are genuinely new and even offer a pleasing catharsis following
our hubris pertaining to the re-examination of the RM literature in Section 3.1.4.
3.2.1. The Axiom of Choice and NBI. We connect NBI to choice principles, some
of which provable in ZF. On a foundational note, we establish that Zω2 +¬NBI is a
rather strong (consistent) system in which R can be viewed as a potential infinity.
First of all, given countable choice, there is the following obvious proof of NBI.
Theorem 3.21. The system RCAω0 + QF-AC
0,1 proves NBI, while Zω2 does not.
Proof. For the first part, suppose Y : [0, 1]→ N is a bijection. Apply QF-AC0,1 to
(∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n) to obtain a sequence (xn)n∈N such that Y (xn) = n
for all n ∈ N. Now use [82, II.4.9] to obtain y ∈ [0, 1] such that y 6=R xn for all
n ∈ N. For n0 = Y (y), we have Y (xn0) = Y (y), a contradiction.
16By Corollary 3.29, ∆-CA plus the Cantor-Schro¨der-Bernstein theorem for A = N and B ⊂ R
(see Example A.3) does prove these equivalences; this combination seems rather ad hoc, however.
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For the second part, we show that the model Q∗ from Definition 2.27 contains
a bijection from Q[1] to N. Using the notation from this definition, we construct
a functional F : A → N that will be both injective and surjective; we show that
F ∈ B0. Intuitively, F is the limit of the increasing sequence of partial functionals
Fk : Ak → N, while each Fk is partially computable in S
2
k. In this way, element-
hood in B0 is guaranteed, as required for the theorem. We define Fk by recursion
on k, and since ∃2 is available, we may freely check equality between functions. We
assume, in this proof, that the pairing function 〈·, ·〉 is surjective.
Let F0(f) = 〈0, e〉 where e is an index for computing f from ∃2, obtained using
Gandy selection, see Theorem 2.20 and Corollary 2.21. Now assume that Fk is
constructed such that if Fk(f) = 〈i, d〉 then i ≤ k. Let hk ∈ Ak+1 enumerate Ak.
Let {hk,n}n∈N be a 1-1 enumeration of all functions h′ that equal hk except for
a finite set of arguments. Note that no such function h′ will be in Ak. Since the
range of Fk is computable in S
2
k+1, we can split the definition of Fk+1 in three cases
(with case distinction decidable by S2k+1) as follows:
(i) Put Fk+1(f) = Fk(f) if f ∈ Ak.
(ii) Let Ck be the (infinite by the definition of Fk) set of c ∈ N such that 〈k, c〉 is
not in the range of Fk and let {ck,n}n∈N enumerate Ck in increasing order.
Let Fk+1(hk,n) = 〈k, cn〉. Then Fk+1 fills in holes in the range left by Fk.
(iii) Suppose f ∈ Ak+1, f 6∈ Ak, and f 6= hk,n for all n. Put Fk+1(f) = 〈k+1, e〉,
where e is an index for computing f from S2k+1 and g0, . . . , gk, obtained
using Gandy selection (see Theorem 2.20 and Corollary 2.21).
Item (ii) secures that the limit functional F is surjective as well as injective. 
Since NIN implies NBI, there is a proof of the latter in ZF and much weaker
fragments. Towards the latter kind of (elementary) proof, the following ‘weak’
choice principle NCC, provable in ZΩ2 , was introduced in [70].
Definition 3.22. [NCC] For Y 2 and A(n,m) ≡ (∃f ∈ 2N)(Y (f,m, n) = 0):
(∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N)A(n,m)→ (∃g : N → N)(∀n ∈ N)A(n, g(n)). (3.4)
The principle Σ-NFP is similar17 to NCC and the former immediately implies
the latter, and HBU together with WKL, as shown in [75, §5].
The motivation for [70] and NCC was as follows: most results in [66–69,75] that
use QF-AC0,1, go through with the latter replaced by NCC; of course, Zω2 does not
prove NCC. The latter also does the job for NBI and Theorem 3.21, as follows.
Theorem 3.23. RCAω0 + NCC proves NBI, while Z
ω
2 + NCC cannot prove NIN.
Proof. The second part is immediate by Theorem 3.1. For the first part, let Y :
[0, 1]→ N be a bijection and note that we have (∃2) due to [49, §3]. The functional
∃2 allows us to convert real numbers in [0, 1] to binary representation. Consider
the following (trivial) formula
(∀n ∈ N)(∃q ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1])
[
(∃x ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n ∧ [x](2n+ 4) = q
]
. (3.6)
17Similar to (3.4), Σ-NFP states that for A(σ0
∗
) ≡ (∃g ∈ 2N)(Y (g, σ) = 0), we have
(∀f ∈ NN)(∃n ∈ N)A(fn)→ (∃g ∈ K0)(∀f ∈ N
N)A(fg(f)), (3.5)
where ‘g ∈ K0’ means that g is an RM-code. The axiom NFP is (3.5) for any formula A and can
be found in [91, p. 215]; as studied in [75], fragments of NFP populate the non-normal world.
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Modulo obvious coding, the square-bracketed formula in (3.6) has the right form for
applying NCC. Let (rn)n∈N be the resulting sequence of rationals. We now consider
the proof of [82, II.4.9]. The latter expresses that for every sequence (xn)n∈N of
real numbers, there is y ∈ [0, 1] such that y 6= xn for all n ∈ N. The real y is defined
as the limit limn→∞ an where (a0, b0) = (0, 1), [xn] = qn,k ∈ Q, and
(an+1, bn+1) :=
{
(an+3bn4 , bn) qn,2n+3 ≤ (an + bn)/2
(an,
3an+bn
4 ) otherwise
. (3.7)
The crux now is to observe that in (3.7), one only uses finitely much information
about each xn, namely the approximation qn,2n+3. Hence, using rn instead of
qn,2n+3, (3.7) provides a real y ∈ [0, 1] which is such that if Y (x) = n, then x 6=R y,
for any x ∈ [0, 1] and n ∈ N. Now for n0 := Y (y), there is z ∈ [0, 1] such that
Y (z) = n0, but z 6=R y by construction, a contradiction. 
The previous proof is quite illustrative: QF-AC0,1 is often used to produce a
sequence of reals; if the subsequent argument only needs finitely much information
about each element in the sequence (which is often the case), then NCC suffices.
Let NCCw be NCC with g in (3.4) only providing an upper bound on the m-variable.
Corollary 3.24. The theorem remains valid if we replace NCC by NCCw.
Proof. We assume ¬NBI and therefore have (∃2). The latter allows us to find a
bijection F : NN → N. Now consider the following formula A(n,m):
(∃w1
∗
)
[
|w| = n+ 1 ∧ (∀i < |w|)(F (w(i)) = i− 1) ∧m = (
∑n
i=1 w(i)(n)) + 1],
and note that (∀n ∈ N)(∃m ∈ N)A(n,m). Let g : N → N be such that (∀n ∈
N)(∃m ≤ g(n))A(n,m) as provided by NCCw (modulo obvious coding). By defini-
tion, the function g dominates all other functions, which yields a contradiction. 
3.2.2. Countable sets versus sets that are countable II. In this section, we derive NBI
from basic theorems about countable sets where the latter has its usual meaning,
namely Definition 3.25 taken from [39]. In Section 3.1.4, our hubris was to claim
the need for a re-examination of the entire RM-literature in light of the actual
definition of countable set. The current section provides a level of catharsis in
light of Corollary 3.29. Indeed, the latter suggests an elegant base theory in which
(theorems about) strongly countable sets behave ‘as they should’.
First of all, we generalise Corollary 3.19 to a stronger definition of ‘countable
set’, as can e.g. be found in [39]. We note that Borel uses this definition in [9].
Definition 3.25. [Strongly countable] A set A ⊆ R is strongly countable if there is
Y : R → N with (∀x, y ∈ A)(Y (x) = Y (y)→ x = y)∧(∀n ∈ N)(∃x ∈ A)(Y (x) = n).
Let HBC1 be HBC0 from Section 3.1.4 restricted to strongly countable sets.
Theorem 3.26. RCAω0 proves HBC1 → NBI while Z
ω
2 + HBC1 cannot prove NIN.
Proof. The negative result follows from Theorem 3.1 as QF-AC0,1 yields a sequence
enumerating a strongly countable set, i.e. Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1 proves HBC1. For the
positive result, let Y : [0, 1] → N be a bijection and note that [0, 1] is strongly
countable as in Definition 3.25. Fix Ψ : [0, 1]→ R+ and define A as the countable
set {(x−Ψ(x), x+Ψ(x)) : x ∈ [0, 1]}. Applying HBC1, there is a finite sub-cover and
HBU follows. Since HBU→ WHBU, Theorem 3.2 yields NIN, a contradiction. 
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In the same way as in the previous proof, items (i)-(viii) from Section 3.1.4
formulated with Definition 3.25 all yield principles that imply NBI but not NIN.
This shall follow from the below results pertaining to ∆-CA.
Next, it is a natural question what the weakest comprehension axiom is that still
proves NBI. As it happens, we have a candidate, namely ∆-comprehension as in
Principle 3.27. We discuss the importance of ∆-CA in Remark 3.30.
Principle 3.27 (∆-CA). For i = 0, 1, Y 2i , and Ai(n) ≡ (∃f ∈ N
N)(Yi(f, n) = 0):
(∀n ∈ N)(A0(n)↔ ¬A1(n))→ (∃X ⊂ N)(∀n ∈ N)(n ∈ X ↔ A0(n)).
As shown in [70, §3.1], NCC implies ∆-CA, but the following proof is interesting.
Theorem 3.28. RCAω0 proves ∆-CA→ NBI, while Z
ω
2 +∆-CA cannot prove NIN.
Proof. For the second part, RCAω0 + QF-AC
0,1 proves ∆-CA by [77, Theorem 3.5].
This is done by applying QF-AC0,1 to (∀n ∈ N)(¬A1(n) → A0(n)). Hence, Z
ω
2 +
∆-CA cannot prove NIN by (the second part of) Theorem 3.1. Alternatively, NCC→
∆-CA by [70, Theorem 3.1] and use Theorem 3.23.
For the first part, assume ∆-CA and let Y : [0, 1] → N be a bijection. Recall
we have access to (∃2). Let (qn)n∈N be an enumeration of the rationals in [0, 1].
Consider the following equivalence for n,m ∈ N and r ∈ Q+:
(∃x ∈ B(qm, r) ∩ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n)↔ (∀y ∈ [0, 1] \B(qm, r))(Y (y) 6= n). (3.8)
Note that the reverse implication in (3.8) only holds because Y is a bijection.
Modulo coding, ∆-CA yields X ⊂ N2 × Q such that for all n,m ∈ N and r ∈ Q+:
(n,m, r) ∈ X ↔ (∃x ∈ B(qm, r) ∩ [0, 1])(Y (x) = n) (3.9)
We now use X and the well-known interval-halving technique to create a sequence
(xn)n∈N as follows. For fixed n ∈ N, define [xn](0) as 0 if (∃x ∈ [0, 1/2))(Y (x) = n),
and 1/2 otherwise; define [xn](m + 1) as [xn](m) if (∃x ∈
[
[xn](m), [xn](m) +
1
2m+1
))
(Y (x) = n), and [xn](m)+
1
2m+1 otherwise. By definition, we have Y (xn) = n
for all n ∈ N; use [82, II.4.9] to find y0 ∈ [0, 1] not in the sequence (xn)n∈N. Then
n0 = Y (y0) yields a contradiction as xn0 6=R y and Y (y0) = Y (xn0 ). 
The previous proof inspired us to formulate Example A.7 in Appendix A. For
the next corollary, let cocode1 be cocode0 restricted to strongly countable sets.
Corollary 3.29. RCAω0 proves ∆-CA→ cocode1 and [cocode1 +WKL]→ HBC1.
Proof. In the final part of the proof of the theorem, replace ‘[0, 1]’ by ‘A’ and note
that ∆-CA→ cocode1 follows. The second implication is by [82, IV.1]. 
As argued in Remark 3.30 and [77, 78], ∆-CA yields a good base theory for a
purpose rather unrelated to our current enterprise. Another argument in favour of
this axiom is that RCAω0 + ∆-CA proves WKL ↔ HBC1 by Corollary 3.29, a very
desirable catharsis in light of Theorem 3.21. Similarly, BW1 ↔ ACA0 given ∆-CA,
where the former is BW0 restricted to strongly countable sets.
Remark 3.30 (Lifting proofs). As suggested by its structure, ∆-CA is the ‘higher-
order’ version of ∆01-comprehension, where the latter is included in RCA0. Using
∆-CA, one can almost verbatim ‘lift’ second-order proofs to more general and in-
teresting proofs in third-order (and higher) arithmetic. As an example, we consider
the proof that the monotone convergence theorem implies ACA0 from [82, III.2.2]
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based on Specker sequences. As explored in detail in [75, 77, 78], one can use this
same proof with no essential modification to establish that the monotone conver-
gence theorem for nets implies BOOT based on Specker nets. In this ‘lifted’ proof,
one uses ∆-CA instead of ∆01-comprehension. A proof of this implication not using
∆-CA is also given in [75, §3], but the point is that second-order proofs can be ‘re-
cycled’ as interesting proofs in third-order (and higher) arithmetic. Many examples
are discussed in [77, 78].
We suspect a connection between ∆-CA and ∆11-comprehension (see [82] for the
latter), but no evidence can be offered at this point in time.
Finally, we note that Lebesgue1, i.e. Lebesgue0 restricted to strongly countable
sets, satisfies cocode1 → Lebesgue1 → NBI. In the same way as for Corollary 3.17,
Zω2 cannot prove that strongly countable RM-closed sets are given by a sequence.
Corollary 3.31. The restriction of cocode1 or Lebesgue1 to RM-closed sets A ⊂ R
still implies NBI.
One can push the previous corollary further as follows: NBI follows from the
statement an RM-closed strongly countable subset of R has measure < +∞.
In conclusion, we note that the above results (mainly) pertains to analysis, but
NBI even follows from the original graph-theoretical lemma by Ko¨nig from [47], as
discussed in Example A.17.
4. The uncountability of R in computability theory
We establish the computational properties of NIN following Kleene’s framework
introduced in Section 2.2.
4.1. Comprehension and fan functionals. We show that N as in NIN(N) is
hard to compute, relative to the usual scale of comprehension functionals S2k. We
again stress that this should be interpreted as support for the study of (strongly)
non-normal functionals of type 3, i.e. functionals in which ∃3 is not computable
relative to ∃2, of which Corollary 4.2 constitutes an example. The type of N as in
NIN(N) is written ‘3’ for simplicity.
Theorem 4.1. A functional N3 as in NIN(N) is not computable from any type
two functional.
Proof. Let F be of type 2; without loss of generality we may assume that F is
normal. Let G be the partial functional obtained from F as in Corollary 2.21.
Let H be any total extension of G. If N as in NIN(N) is computable in F , then
N(H) = (x, y) such that H(x) = H(y) for x 6= y. However, by Lemma 2.15 both x
and y are computable in F , so H(x) 6= H(y) by the choice of G. 
While the proofs in the previous section are by contradiction, we now show that a
realiser for WHBU also computes N as in NIN(N). As to the former, a Λ-functional
(or: weak fan functional) is a type three functional such that Λ(Y, ε) outputs the
finite sequence y0, . . . , yk of distinct reals as in WHBU. Slightly different definitions
are used in e.g. [64,65] for ‘realisers for WHBU’, but all are equivalent up to a term
of Go¨del’s T . The following is officially a corollary to Theorem 3.2.
Corollary 4.2. Any Λ-functional computes N as in NIN(N).
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Proof. To defineN(Y ), define Ψ0(x) :=
1
2Y (x)+3
and consider Λ(Ψ0,
1
2 ) = (y0, . . . , yk),
where the yi are assumed distinct. Note that since
1
2 <R
∑
i≤k |J
Ψ0
yi | by definition,
we cannot have that all Y (yi) are distinct, similar to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Thus, let N(Y ) output any two yi, yj in Λ(Ψ0,
1
2 ) such that Y (yi) = Y (yj). 
Next, we show that realisers for BCT cannot be computed by any type-two
functional, based on (the proof of) Theorem 3.2 and Lemma 2.15. This yields a
simpler proof of [68, Theorem 6.6], which has the same content as Theorem 4.4.
We recall that open sets (here and in [68]) are given by characteristic functions.
Definition 4.3. [Realiser for BCT] A Baire-realiser is a total functional ζ that
takes as input a sequence {Xn : n ∈ N} of subsets of [0, 1], and outputs a real
ζ({Xn : n ∈ N}) ∈
⋂
n∈NXn whenever each Xn is open and dense.
Theorem 4.4. No Baire realiser is computable in any type two functional.
Proof. We take the (computational) connection between [0, 1] and 2N to be known.
Let F be a normal functional of type 2, and assume that a Baire realiser ζ is
computable in F . By Corollary 2.21 there is a partial and injective functional G
with integer values and defined on all reals in [0, 1] computable in F . Let x ∈ Xn
if x is not computable in F , or if x is computable in F and G(x) > n. Each Xn
is open and dense, and the sequence {Xn : n ∈ N} is partially computable in F
on the set of reals computable in F . By Lemma 2.15 and the assumption on ζ, we
must have that ζ({Xn : n ∈ N}) is computable in F , contradicting the fact that
∩nXn contains no reals computable in F . 
4.2. Computing de dicto and de re. In this section, we discuss some subtle
variations of the concept of ‘realiser for open-cover compactness’, and how this
‘trickles down’ to realisers for NIN.
Now, the counterpart of Λ-functionals for HBU are called Θ-functionals, i.e.
realisers for HBU that return the finite sub-cover from the latter (see e.g. [64–66,69]).
Closely related, a Pincherle realiser (PR for short) is a functional M3 that returns
an upper bound M(Ψ) on the length of finite sub-covers from HBU (see e.g. [69]).
Hence, Θ-functionals provide some finite sub-cover, while PRs provide a natural
number (only) such that a finite sub-cover of this length (or shorter) exists. In this
spirit, we define a weak variation of NIN(N) as follows.
(∀Y : [0, 1]→ N)(∃x, y ∈ [0, 1])(Y (x) = Y (y) ∧ Y (x) ≤ N0(Y )). (NIN0(N0))
Similar to a PR, N0(Y ) satisfying NIN0(N0) does not return two real numbers that
map to the same natural number, but only an upper bound for the latter. We still
have the following property.
Theorem 4.5. A functional N30 as in NIN0(N0) is not computable from any type
two functional.
Proof. We modify the proof of Theorem 4.1. Let F and G be as in the proof of the
latter. Let Hn be the extension of G that is constant n outside the domain of G. If
NIN0(N0) we must have that N0(Hn) ≥ n. On the other hand, if N0 is computable
in F we must have that N0(Hn) is independent of n, by Lemma 2.14. Thus, N0 is
not computable in F and we are done. 
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A number of ‘weak’ functionals do compute N0 as in NIN0(N0). It is interesting
to note that even very weak fragments of the Lebesgue measure yield functionals
that are hard to compute as in Theorem 4.5. Note that Wλ describes the properties
of a functional λ : ([0, 1]→ R)→ R, namely the two bullet points in Example A.10.
Theorem 4.6. Together with µ2, any λ as in Wλ computes N0 as in NIN0(N0).
Any PR computes N0 as in NIN0(N0).
Proof. For the second part, fix Y : [0, 1] → N, let M be a PR, and consider
k0 := M(Ψ0) for Ψ0(x) :=
1
2Y (x)+2
. By the definition of PR, there are distinct
y0, . . . , yk0 ∈ [0, 1] such that ∪i≤k0I
Ψ0
yi covers [0, 1]. In particular, we have 1 <R∑
i≤k |J
Ψ0
yi |. However, if Y (yi) 6= Y (yj) for all i, j ≤ k0, then
1
2 >R
∑
i≤k |J
Ψ0
yi | by
the definition of Ψ0. Hence, for some i, j ≤ k0 we must have Y (yi) = Y (yj) and
define N0(Y ) :=M(Ψ0), which satisfies NIN0(N0)
For the first part, let λ be the ‘weak Lebesgue measure’ as in Wλ. Fix Y :
[0, 1] → N and define Xn := {x ∈ [0, 1] : Y (x) = n}. Since [0, 1] = ∪n∈NXn, there
must be m0 ∈ N such that λ(Xm0) >R 0, as otherwise 1 = λ([0, 1]) = λ(∪nXn) = 0
by the properties of measure zero sets under λ. Of course, µ2 can find this number
m0 and there must be at least two reals in Xm0 as λ(∅) = λ({x}) = 0. Define
N0(Y ) as this number m0 and note that NIN0(N0). 
Akin to Lebesgue numbers and the associated functional studied in e.g. [70]), we
could study a stronger version of N0 as in NIN0(N0) such that the output is a real
δ > 0 such that (∃x, y ∈ [0, 1])(|x− y| > δ ∧ Y (x) = Y (y)). In light of the previous,
we offer the following conjecture.
Conjecture 4.7. No PR can compute any N as in NIN(N). No λ as in Wλ can
compute any N as in NIN(N).
Finally, we have previously discussed inductive definitions ([63, 68]) and the fol-
lowing amusing observation illustrates the power of non-monotone induction; it
brings us nothing new with respect to known relative computability. Fix some
F : NN → N and define GF (A) := A ∪ F (A) for A ∈ 2N. Non-monotone inductive
definitions yield the existence of A such that GF (A) ⊆ A. In fact, this induction
stops exactly when we have found A 6= B such that F (A) = F (B), so this induction
is thus a simple NIN-realiser.
Appendix A. Principles related to the uncountability of R
In this appendix, we list some results related to NIN and NBI. We only sketch
the results as introducing the extra technical machinery (say in RCAω0 ) would be
cumbersome or take too much space. All but the first result are positive in nature.
Example A.1 (Well-ordering the reals). Assuming sub-sets of [0, 1] are given as
characteristic functions, Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1 + WO([0, 1]) does not imply NIN, where
WO([0, 1]) expresses that the unit interval can be well-ordered. Indeed, ¬NIN readily
implies WO([0, 1]) by noting that x  y ≡ Y (x) ≤0 Y (y) yields a well-order in case
Y : [0, 1]→ N is an injection.
Example A.2 (Ramsey’s theorem). It is well-known that (infinite) Ramsey’s
theorem for two colours and pairs, abbreviated RT22, does not generalise beyond
the countable. This failure is denoted ‘2ℵ0 6→ (2ℵ0)22’ and can be found in [42,
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Prop. 2.36], going back to Sierpin´ski ([80]). Assuming that R has a total order  in
which each a ∈ R has a unique successor S(a) ∈ R, one can use the aforementioned
proof by Sierpin´ski to show that 2ℵ0 → (2ℵ0)22 implies ¬NIN.
Example A.3 (Cantor-Schro¨der-Bernstein theorem). An early theorem of set the-
ory that implies NIN when combined with NBI is the Cantor-Schro¨der-Bernstein
theorem, originally published without proof by Cantor in [15] (see [16, p. 413]). This
theorem states that if there is an injection f : A→ B and an injection g : B → A,
then there is a bijection between A and B. Thus, assuming ¬NIN, there would be
a bijection between [0, 1] and N, contradicting NBI.
Example A.4 (Baire classes). One can derive NIN from basic properties of Baire
classes on the unit interval. Now, Baire classes go back to Baire’s 1899 dissertation
([3]). A function is ‘Baire class 0’ if it is continuous and ‘Baire class n + 1’ if it
is the pointwise limit of Baire class n functions. Each of these levels is non-trivial
and there are functions that do not belong to any level, as shown by Lebesgue (see
[46, §6.10]). Baire’s characterisation theorem ([3, p. 127]) expresses that a function
is Baire class 1 iff there is a point of continuity of the induced function on each
perfect set. Using the latter formulation of Baire class 1, NIN follows from either
of the statements Baire class 2 does not contain all functions and any Baire class
2 function can be represented by a double sequence of continuous functions.
Example A.5 (Uncountable sums). The concept unordered sum is a device for
bestowing meaning upon ‘uncountable sums’
∑
x∈I f(x) for any index set I and
f : I → R. Whenever
∑
x∈I f(x) exists, it must be a ‘normal’ series of the
form
∑
i∈N f(yi) (see e.g. [88, p. xii]); when the antecedent is formulated using
the Cauchy criterion of convergence, this fact implies NIN. This is of historical
interest as Kelley notes in [43, p. 64] that E.H. Moore’s study of unordered sums
in [60] led to the concept of nets with his student Smith ([61]). Unordered sums
can be found in basic or applied textbooks ([40,84,88]) and can be used to develop
measure theory ([43, p. 79]). Tukey develops topology in [93] based on phalanxes, a
special kind of net with the same structure on the index set as uncountable sums.
Example A.6 (Topology). The following topological results formulated in third-
order arithmetic (see [79]) are connected to HBU and the Lindelilo¨f lemma and
therefore imply NIN, though we do not have a direct proof of the latter.
(1) The topological dimension of [0, 1] is at most 1.
(2) The Urysohn identity for the dimensions of [0, 1].
(3) The paracompactness of [0, 1] formulated with uncountable coverings.
(4) The existence of partitions of unity for uncountable coverings of [0, 1].
Presumably, many topological notions pertaining to R depend on its uncountability.
Example A.7 (Separation). Separation axioms of the following kind play an im-
portant role in RM (see e.g. [82, I.11.7]):
(∀n ∈ N)(¬ϕ0(n)∨¬ϕ1(n))→ (∃X ⊂ N)(∀n ∈ N)(ϕ0(n)→ n ∈ X∧ϕ1(n)→ n 6∈ X).
One readily proves that HBU is equivalent to this schema for ϕi(n) ≡ (∃f ∈
2N)(Y (f, n) = 0). Moreover, this schema readily implies NIN as in the proof of
Theorem 3.28. Indeed, for an injection Y : [0, 1] → N, we cannot have (∃x ∈
A)(Y (x) = n) and (∃y ∈ [0, 1] \A)(Y (y) = n) at the same time, for any A ⊂ [0, 1].
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Example A.8 (Connectedness). A space is connected if it is not the sum of two
open disjoint sets. This notion is considered in RM in [82, X.1.5] and [10, p.
193]; the unit interval is mentioned as being connected. The connectedness of [0, 1]
implies NIN for a general enough notion of open set that includes (i) uncountable
unions, and (ii) boolean combinations of uncountable unions that are again open
(according to the usual definition).
The following two examples pertain to the (fourth order) Lebesgue integral/measure
and establish that its very basic properties cannot be proved in Zω2 + QF-AC
0,1.
Example A.9 (Lebesgue integral). The Lebesgue integral is well-known and one
can derive NIN from the former’s axiomatic formulation as an operator I : ([0, 1]→
R)→ R satisfying the following rather basic properties (assuming ACAω0 ).
• For a, b, c ∈ R, I(Ba,b,c) = a× b where Ba,b,c is a ‘box’ with height b, width
a, and bottom left corner (c, 0) such that a+ c ≤ 1.
• Finite additivity for finite sums of non-overlapping ‘box’ functions.
• Dominated convergence theorems for functions as in the previous item.
We may replace the third item by the monotone convergence theorem. In fact,
the dominated and monotone convergence theorems for the Lebesgue integral, as
formulated in Bishop’s constructive framework ([8, Ch. 6]), also imply NIN.
Example A.10 (Lebesgue measure). The Lebesgue measure is well-known and
one can derive NIN from the former’s axiomatic formulation as an operator λ :
([0, 1]→ R)→ R satisfying the following rather basic properties (assuming ACAω0 ).
Note that we view ‘subsets of [0, 1] as characteristic functions’ as in [53, 67, 68].
• For any x ∈ [0, 1], λ(∅) = λ({x}) = 0 and λ([0, 1]) = 1.
• We have λ(∪n∈NEn) = 0 if (∀n ∈ N)(λ(En) = 0).
The same result follows if we take the last item together with λ([a, b]) = |a− b| for
[a, b] ⊆ [0, 1] and λ(E) ≤ λ(E ∪ [c, d]) for E ∪ [c, d] ⊆ [0, 1]. We could also replace
the last item by disjoint countable additivity, a property provable in RCA0 for the
second-order approach ([82, X.1.6]). Another suitable property is the ‘continuity
from below’ of the Lebesgue measure.
Example A.11 (Lebesgue integral II). The monotone convergence theorem for
the Lebesgue integral is well-known. The following special case implies NIN but
does not involve the bound from Arz; the conclusion can be stated as in WHBU.
For a monotone sequence of Riemann integrable functions (fn)n∈N suppose that
limn→∞ fn(x) = f(x) for all x ∈ [0, 1] and limn→∞
∫ 1
0
fn(x)dx exists. Then the
Lebesgue integral
∫
[0,1]
f exists.
In particular, define gn(x) as 1/x if Y (x) = n and x 6= 0, and 0 otherwise. Then
limn→∞ fn(x) =
1
x for x 6= 0 and fn(x) :=
∑n
i=0 gi(x), as for Theorem 3.4.
Example A.12 (Probability theory). Kolmogorov’s three axioms ([51]) of a prob-
ability measure P on events E in a sample space Ω are as follows.
• Any event E has a probability in [0, 1], i.e. 0 ≤ P (E) ≤ 1.
• The sample space Ω satisfies P (Ω) = 1.
• For (En)n∈N mutually exclusive events, we have P (∪n∈NEn) =
∑∞
n=0 P (En).
In case Ω = [0, 1] and P ({x}) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1], NIN follows by noting that for
En = {x ∈ [0, 1] : Y (x) = n}, we have 1 = P ([0, 1]) = P (∪nEn) =
∑
n P (En) = 0.
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Example A.13 (Borel-Cantelli lemma). The Borel-Cantelli lemma is formulated
in e.g. [72, p. 46] as follows:
Let (Ek)k∈N be a countable collection of measurable sets with
∑∞
k=0m(Ek) <∞.
Then almost all x ∈ R belong to at most finitely many of the Ek’s.
By applying this lemma to Ek = {x ∈ [0, 1] : Y (x) = k}, we can show that
Y : [0, 1]→ N is not an injection.
Example A.14 (Universal theorems). It is a commonplace that theorems on R →
R-functions generally only deal with a sub-class, e.g. all continuous or differentiable
functions. There are ‘universal’ theorems that apply to all R → R-functions. It is
easy to show that NIN follows from [7, Theorem III] as follows.
With every function f(x, y) there is associated (not uniquely, however) a dense
set D of the XY plane such that f(x, y) is continuous, if (x, y) ranges over D.
There are of course more examples of similar, but less basic, theorems. We believe
that E.H. Moore’s general analysis ([58, 59]) contains the first universal theorems.
Example A.15 (Weak covering lemmas). There are numerous covering lemmas
and related results that imply HBU or LIN(R), as discussed in [66]. The following
principle is among the weakest covering lemmas that imply NIN.
There are non-identical a, b ∈ [0, 1] such that for any Ψ : [0, 1]→ R+ there is a
sequence (xn)n∈N such that [a, b] ⊂ ∪n∈NIΨxn .
One readily derives the latter from the former, which has no first-order strength.
Example A.16 (Weak converence). Banach’s weak convergence theorem from
[22, p. 405, Theorem 1.2] states the following:
Let (fn)n∈N be a uniformly bounded sequence of scalar-valued functions defined on
a set S. Then fn converge weakly to zero in the space B(S) of bounded functions
on S under the supremum norm iff for any sequence (sk)k∈N of points in S we
have limn→∞ limk→∞ fn(sk) = 0.
One derives NIN from this theorem in the same way as for Theorem 3.4.
Finally, a lot can be said about various lemmas due to Ko¨nig from [47].
Example A.17 (Ko¨nig’s lemmas). As is well-known, ACA0 is equivalent to the
statement every infinite finitely branching tree has a path ([82, III.7.2]). We shall
refer to the latter as Ko¨nig’s tree lemma; Simpson refers to [47] as the original
source for Ko¨nig’s tree lemma in [82, p. 125], but [47] does not even mention the
word ‘tree’ (i.e. the word ‘Baum’ in German). In fact, the formulation involving
trees apparently goes back to Beth around 1955 in [6], as discussed in detail [97].
Ko¨nig’s original lemmas from [47], formulated there both in the lingo of graph
theory and set theory, imply NBI.
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